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Zaba v. Motor Vehicle Division12/10/1973
Appellants Zaba and Work in separate proceedings before the appellee (Motor Vehicle Division) had their driver's licenses suspended. In both cases, an accumulation of points derived from traffic violations was the basis for the suspensions which are authorized by statutory law.
1969 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-4-23(1)(a) in pertinent part provides:
"The department shall have the authority to suspend the license of any operator or chauffeur who, in accordance with the schedule of points set forth in this section, has been convicted of traffic violations resulting in the accumulation of twelve points within any twelve consecutive months, or eighteen points within any twenty-four consecutive months, . . . ."
In the Zaba case, because of the dates of the administrative proceedings, the 1965 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-4-23(1)(a) was the statute in force. However, it is identical with the pertinent part of the 1969 version quoted above which is the statute applicable in the Work case. For the purposes of this opinion therefore, we will refer only to the 1969 amendment.
Both Zaba and Work in separate cases appealed their license suspensions to the district court. In each case, the district court affirmed the suspensions. Zaba and Work, who are represented by the same attorney, thereupon initiated appeals to this court. Their cases have been consolidated in this court because of several constitutional issues common to both. We resolve all these issues and alleged errors in favor of the appellee and therefore, affirm the judgments in the district court.
I.
The appellants contend that 1969 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-4-23(1)(a) is unconstitutional for the following reasons: It is overbroad in its terminology; it is vague and indefinite; and it contains standards which are unmanageable and uncertain. Thus, the appellants argue that this statute violates their rights to due process of law. The appellants also allege that the statute constitutes an unreasonable exercise of
the police power.
All of the appellants' arguments in this regard are directed against that portion of 1969 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 13-4-23(1)(a) which is quoted in the second paragraph of this opinion. It is the appellants' position that when this part of the statute grants the Motor Vehicle Division authority to suspend the driver's license of any operator who has accumulated "twelve points within any twelve consecutive months, or eighteen points within any twenty-four consecutive months" (Emphasis added.), it is overbroad, vague, indefinite and thus, in violation of the appellants' constitutional rights of due process of law. They maintain that the authority delegated to the Motor Vehicle Division is an unbridled and unlimited power which actually grants that agency the power to suspend a driver's license for point accumulation in any prior period which the Motor Vehicle Division might delve up from the operator's past driving history. The appellants argue that the Motor Vehicle Division under the authority of this statute as it is worded could conceivably suspend a driver's license in 1972 for a point accumulation in 1942. These arguments by the appellants are without merit.
Legislative history clearly demonstrates that it was the intent of the legislature to authorize the Motor Vehicle Division to consider that period of time ending with the date of the last violation involved. In Markham v. Theobald, 152 Colo. 540, 383 P.2d 791 (1963), we held that an earlier version of this statute required th
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