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Stone v. Commonwealth3/17/2003
The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (trial court), sustaining the appeal of Deanna Rae Stone (Licensee) with respect to DOT's requirement that she install an ignition interlock system on all vehicles owned by her as a condition to having her operating privileges restored. We now affirm.
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Licensee was originally arrested and charged with driving under the influence (DUI), in violation of Section 3731(a) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §3731, on June 26, 1997. Licensee initially accepted admission into an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program. Nevertheless, Licensee was later removed from the program and was subsequently convicted of the 1997 DUI offense on April 13, 1998. As a result of this conviction, DOT sent Licensee a notice dated May 12, 1998, suspending her operating privileges for a period of one year.
Licensee was again arrested and charged with DUI on October 10, 2001. She was later convicted of her second DUI offense in the trial court's criminal division on February 19, 2002. Nonetheless, following her conviction, the trial court failed to impose upon Licensee the ignition interlock requirement found at Section 7002(b) of the Ignition Interlock Device Act (Act). Moreover, there was no appeal by the local district attorney regarding the trial court's failure to impose such a requirement.
By notice dated April 11, 2002, DOT informed Licensee that her operating privileges were being suspended for a period of one year. This same notice further informed Licensee that before her operating privileges would be restored, she would have to have an ignition interlock device installed on all vehicles that she owned. Licensee thereafter filed a statutory appeal with the trial court with respect to this ignition interlock requirement. In her appeal, Licensee essentially alleged that DOT could not unilaterally modify a sentence so as to include requirements, such as an ignition interlock device, not ordered by the sentencing judge.
The trial court conducted a de novo hearing on July 22, 2002. At this hearing, DOT introduced into evidence a packet of documents, duly certified and under seal, from the Secretary of Transportation. The packet included a copy of DOT's April 11, 2002, suspension notice to Licensee as well as a certified copy of a report from the trial court's Clerk of Courts regarding Licensee's second DUI conviction. This report indicated that the trial court did not impose an ignition interlock requirement. DOT then rested. Counsel for Licensee offered no exhibits or testimony. Instead, counsel merely indicated his belief that the case is controlled by this Court's prior decision in Schneider v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).
By order dated July 25, 2002, the trial court sustained Licensee's appeal concerning the ignition interlock requirement and rescinded any such requirement included in DOT's April 11, 2002, notice. DOT filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. The trial court thereafter issued an opinion in support of its order indicating that the case was indistinguishable from and controlled by our prior decision in Schneider, wherein we held that DOT lacked an independent mandate to impose ignition interlock requirements in the absence of a court order.
On appeal to this Court, DOT argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to conclude that it has an independent mandate under Section 7003 of the Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §7003, to enforce the ignition interlock requireme
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