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Commonwealth v. Lynch3/19/2003
1 Mark Lynch appeals from the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition. We affirm.
2 Lynch argues he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea:
1. because trial counsel unlawfully induced him to plead guilty when the plea agreement was illusory; or
2. in the alternative, because counsel unlawfully induced his guilty plea when no plea agreement existed; or
3. if a plea agreement existed, the Commonwealth violated the agreement by having the victim's family testify and make sentencing recommendations.
3 The trial court found as a fact that defense counsel made no representations that there was any plea agreement, which the record supports. Therefore, arguments #1 and #2 fail.
4 The trial court also found that in fact there was no plea agreement, so argument #3 fails.
5 We note that the trial court followed the wrong standard by looking to the guilty plea subsection of the PCRA rather than the subsection governing the ineffective assistance of counsel. While Lynch's 1925(b) statement echoes the wording of the guilty plea subsection, his supplemental PCRA petition argued both the guilty plea and ineffectiveness subsections, and his brief to this court plainly argues ineffectiveness in relation to his guilty plea. Since the trial court found as a fact that trial counsel made no unwarranted representations to Lynch, the differing standard makes no difference so we find no ineffectiveness and affirm, albeit on different grounds.
6 A full discussion follows.
I. Background
7 On May 17, 1999, while highly intoxicated, Lynch drove north in the south-bound lanes of Interstate 83 in Harrisburg and collided head-on with James E. Dorothy. Dorothy did not survive the accident. Lynch was charged with and pled guilty to homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence , homicide by vehicle, involuntary manslaughter, and driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance, as well as Motor Vehicle Code violations.
8 The trial court sentenced Lynch to five to ten years of imprisonment on the homicide by vehicle while DUI charge, a consecutive term of two to five years of imprisonment on involuntary manslaughter, and no further penalty on the other counts. The trial court sua sponte vacated the sentence as an illegal sentence, holding that the involuntary manslaughter charge merged for purposes of sentencing. However, the Commonwealth moved for reconsideration arguing that involuntary manslaughter did not merge. The trial court granted the motion and reinstated the original sentence.
9 Eleven months later, Lynch filed a pro se motion to enforce a plea agreement, which the trial court treated as a PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed, who filed a supplemental PCRA petition. That petition raised the following issues: whether he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because trial counsel unlawfully induced him to plead guilty when the plea agreement was illusory, or in the alternative, that counsel unlawfully induced his guilty plea when no plea agreement existed. In addition, assuming arguendo a plea agreement existed, Lynch asserted that the Commonwealth's attorney had violated the agreement by having the victim's family testify and make sentencing recommendations.
10 After a hearing, the PCRA court denied the petition, finding as facts that no plea agreement existed, that trial counsel did not rely on an illusory promise, and that trial counsel made no unwarranted statements to Lynch. Agreeing with the Commonwealth that the guilty plea subsection controlled, the court found
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