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People v. Shaver7/6/1981
JUSTICE QUINN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
David Allen Shaver (defendant) appeals his conviction for Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973. The defendant claims that the statutory scheme of the Habitual Traffic Offender Act, section 42-2-201 et seq., C.R.S. 1973, on which his conviction is based, violates due process of law and equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 25, and the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, U.S. Const. Amend. VIII; Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 20. He also asserts that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from establishing the constitutional invalidity of three traffic offense convictions which formed the basis of an order of license revocation by the Department of Revenue (department). Although we find no merit in the defendant's constitutional challenges to the Habitual Traffic Offender Act, we conclude that the trial court failed to determine by appropriate standards the constitutional validity of the three traffic offense convictions underlying the order of revocation. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I.
The crime of Driving After Judgment Prohibited is defined in section 42-2-206(1), C.R.S. 1973, as follows:
"It is unlawful for any person to operate any motor vehicle in this state while the revocation of the department prohibiting the operation remains in effect. Any person found to be an habitual offender, who is thereafter convicted of operating a motor vehicle in this state while the revocation of the department prohibiting such operation is in effect, is guilty of a class 5 felony."
A direct information filed against the defendant alleged that he committed the crime of Driving After Judgment Prohibited by operating a motor vehicle on January 20, 1978, in the City of Fort Morgan while there was still in effect an order of the department revoking his license as a habitual traffic offender. The defendant entered a not guilty plea to the charge. Prior to jury selection defense counsel advised the court that he intended to challenge the admissibility of the defendant's three traffic offense convictions underlying his license revocation as a habitual traffic offender.
The prosecution's case consisted of two witnesses, and several documents of the department. A Fort Morgan officer testified that he arrested the defendant on January 20, 1978, in Fort Morgan for driving a pick-up truck without a driver's license. The prosecution's other witness, an investigator for the department, was asked to identify several official records of the department pertaining to the defendant. These records included a written notice to the defendant of a revocation hearing and an order of August 30, 1976, revoking his driver's license for five years under section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, as a habitual traffic offender.
The defendant, outside the presence of the jury, objected to the admission of the order of revocation for the reason that the three traffic offense convictions supporting the revocation resulted from pleas of guilty in violation of his constitutional right to counsel and due process of law. The pleas were entered in the County Court of Morgan County to the three separate charges of driving under suspension, section 42-2-130(1)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8 and 1980 Supp.), all of which occurred within the requisite statutory period prece
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