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People v. Mascarenas8/31/1981
JUSTICE LOHR delivered the Opinion of the Court
This is an interlocutory appeal by the district attorney in a prosecution of the defendant, Rudy Mascarenas, for Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206(1), C.R.S. 1973. The district attorney challenges a ruling of the District Court for Rio Grande County that one of the traffic offense convictions supporting an habitual traffic offender determination of the Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division (DMV), was obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. Art. II, § 16. The court concluded that the defendant made a prima facie showing, unrebutted by the prosecution, that he was not represented by counsel and had not waived such representation at the time he offered the plea of guilty upon which his traffic offense conviction was based. We conclude that the defendant did not make a prima facie showing that his right to counsel was violated and so reverse the ruling of the trial court.
A police officer stopped the defendant, who was driving a motor vehicle on the streets of Monte Vista, and cited him for attempting to elude a police officer, section 18-9-116.5, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), and driving a motor vehicle while his license was suspended for failure to furnish proof of financial responsibility, section 42-7-422, C.R.S. 1973. Later, the district attorney learned that the DMV had found the defendant to be an habitual traffic offender and consequently had revoked his privilege to operate a motor vehicle prior to the incident for which he was stopped in Monte Vista. The district attorney then filed an "amended complaint/information," charging the defendant with Driving After Judgment Prohibited in addition to the two offenses for which he was originally cited.
The defendant moved to dismiss the charge of Driving After Judgment Prohibited, or to suppress the underlying traffic offense convictions, on the basis that his constitutional right to counsel was violated in the proceedings which resulted in the three traffic offense convictions upon which the DMV's order revoking his driver's license was based. After a hearing, held immediately before a scheduled jury trial, the court ruled that the defendant's challenges to two of the convictions were not meritorious, but found that the third, a conviction in Denver County Court, had been obtained in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. The court suppressed that conviction; the district attorney then brought this interlocutory appeal.
I.
We have described the statutory framework for a charge of Driving After Judgment Prohibited in People v. Roybal, Colo., 617 P.2d 800 (1980) (Roybal II):
Section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, grants the Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division (DMV), authority to revoke the driver's license of an habitual traffic offender for a period of five years. An habitual traffic offender is any person who, after notice and administrative hearing, is found by the DMV to have sustained a designated number of convictions for specified traffic offenses within a prescribed period of time. Section 42-2-202, C.R.S. 1973. Operation of a motor vehicle while such a revocation is in effect constitutes the class 5 felony of Driving After Judgment Prohibited. Section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973.
617 P.2d at 801.
A defendant charged with Driving After Judgm
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