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State v. Steelman9/13/1978
rule. State v. Sisk, 112 Ariz. 484, 543 P.2d 1113 (1975). We find no due process violation.
But Steelman contends further that the application of the M'Naghten rule to him is a violation of the equal protection of the laws. The basic rule of equal protection in criminal cases is that no person should be subject to a greater or different punishment than another in similar circumstances. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 1 S.Ct. 637, 27 L.Ed. 207 (1883). Steelman claims that all of those who have been diagnosed as mentally ill are similarly situated and therefore a rule which distinguishes among different forms of mental illness to determine criminal responsibility violates equal protection because some are punished and some are acquitted by reason of insanity. We do not agree.
The M'Naghten rule is not an attempt to define insanity or mental illness or to distinguish and discriminate among them. The M'Naghten rule is used to determine who should be held responsible for criminal conduct regardless of the nature of their mental illness. According to the M'Naghten rule, those who do not understand the nature and quality of their actions or do not know that what they do is wrong, are incapable of forming criminal intent. Any one of a variety of mental illnesses can result in an accused being unable to form a criminal intent under the M'Naghten rule. The question of the ability to form a criminal intent is the guiding principle and the rule covers all of those who fit that category regardless of the type or degree of mental illness. The rule,
therefore, does not create a classification among different mental illnesses. We find no error.
Steelman further contends, however, that his right to equal protection of the laws is violated by A.R.S. § 13-132:
"No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition, but when the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act."
Steelman argues that this statute creates an impermissible classification in that it permits a person who has voluntarily intoxicated himself to present evidence of diminished capacity while a person suffering from a mental disorder with the same impact is not permitted to present evidence of the effect of his disorder on his ability to form specific intent. Again we do not agree.
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime, but may be shown only to negate specific intent. State v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 529 P.2d 231 (1974). Insanity, however, is a defense to the crime itself and the M'Naghten rule is our test for such insanity. The statute, A.R.S. § 13-132, is directed to those people who have voluntarily intoxicated themselves to the point where they are incapable of forming a specific intent. We do not believe this is an impermissible classification. There is no violation of defendant's equal protection rights of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, Steelman claims that all of his arguments about the validity of the M'Naghten rule should be considered in the context of this as a capital case. We do not agree. M'Naghten deals with the question of which individuals are capable of forming general criminal intent and should be punished. The death penalty raises the question of the kind o
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