 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Marin v. Colorado Department of Revenue12/7/1978
the trial court and then by it to this court for further review.
Disposition
Reversed.
JUDGE RULAND dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Where, as here, the language of the statute is plain, the meaning of the words is clear, and no absurdity is involved, the statute must be interpreted as written. See Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973). The applicable portion of § 42-4-1202(3)(e), C.R.S. 1973, provides:
"At such hearing, it shall first be determined whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the said person was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol. If reasonable grounds are not established by a preponderance of the evidence, the hearing shall terminate, and no further action shall be taken." (emphasis supplied)
It is apparent that the statute does not require a finding as to whether the licensee was actually operating a vehicle. See Vigil v. Motor Vehicle Division, 184 Colo. 142, 519 P.2d 332 (1974). Rather, the statute unequivocally requires only a finding that the officer had reasonable grounds
to believe that the licensee was operating a vehicle, and the hearing officer properly so found in this case. See e.g., Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, 38 Colo. App. 230, 556 P.2d 488 (1976).
As the majority opinion points out, the purpose of the statute is to assist in the prosecution of drunk driving , and it is evident that the General Assembly concluded that the test should be required in any case where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a licensee has been operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. While the licensee may be inconvenienced by having to take the test in order to retain his license, the defense that he was not operating a motor vehicle is, of course, preserved for presentation during the trial of any charge arising out of the incident.
I would affirm the order.
|