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Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division Department of Revenue8/26/1976
better be served by citation of the most recent compilation, failure to do so is not fatal to the suspension proceedings. See also § 2-4-209, C.R.S. 1973.
Johnson also urges that the police officer did not have reasonable grounds to conclude that he was intoxicated, that since the proceedings at the roadside took no more than 15 minutes he was not afforded sufficient time to make a proper decision, and that it was improper to infer from Johnson's presence in the driver's seat of the stopped vehicle that he had been driving. We find these contentions to be without merit.
With regard to these contentions we observe that proceedings under the implied consent law are civil in nature. See Campbell v. State, 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385 (1971). Here the evidence indicated that the odor of alcohol was present, and that Johnson was unable to touch his nose
or walk a straight line during the roadside sobriety test. This was sufficient basis under which the police officer might infer intoxication and request Johnson to undergo a chemical test.
Similarly, the evidence does not substantiate Johnson's contention that he was pressured to make a decision with no reasonable time to understand what he was doing, and thus the 15 minute roadside proceedings did not deny Johnson due process of law.
Finally, the inference drawn by the police officer that one seated behind the wheel of, and attempting to start, a vehicle stopped in a highway travel lane, was a driver thereof, was not inappropriate, and served as an adequate basis for the officer to proceed pursuant to the implied consent statute.
Judgment affirmed.
Disposition
Affirmed.
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