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State v. Greve3/27/2003
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 25, 2000, Officer Todd Royval, a member of the Chattanooga Police Department's DUI unit, was on routine patrol when he observed the defendant driving a black Infiniti automobile northbound on Lee Highway. According to the officer, the defendant's car "drifted out of his [right-hand] traffic lane over the . . . line to the right" and then "jerked back." Officer Royval then turned on his cruiser's video camera and followed the vehicle. When the defendant's car again drifted to the right and out of its lane, nearly striking a curb, and then moved to the left, crossing the line separating the two northbound lanes of traffic, the officer initiated a traffic stop. While conceding that he saw no particular driving violations, Officer Royval explained that he had stopped the defendant based upon the vehicle's weaving in and out of its lane on three different occasions and the sudden correction of the vehicle the first time it drifted to the right. After the stop, the defendant failed several field sobriety tests and registered a blood alcohol content of .12%.
The defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the investigatory stop on the grounds that Officer Royval did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed. The trial court overruled the motion, finding that the officer had presented specific and articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was guilty of driving under the influence .
Both the state and federal constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures; the general rule is that a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable and any evidence discovered subject to suppression. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tenn. 1997). An automobile stop constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Westbrooks, 594 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). The fact that the detention may be brief and limited in scope does not alter that fact. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653; State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993); Binion, 900 S.W.2d at 705; Westbrooks, 594 S.W.2d at 743. The basic question, as indicated, is whether the seizure was "reasonable." Binion, 900 S.W.2d at 705 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 444). The state always carries the burden of establishing the reasonableness of any detention. See State v. Matthew Manuel, No. 87-96-III (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 23, 1988).
Among the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement is an investigatory stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1968). An investigatory stop is deemed less intrusive than an arrest. See id. In Pulley, our supreme court ruled that "the reasonableness of seizures less intrusive than a full-scale arrest is judged by weighing the gravity of the public concern, the degree to which the seizure advances that concern, and the severity of the intrusion into individual privacy." 863 S.W.2d at 30.
Our determination of the reasonableness of the stop of the vehicle depends on whether the officers had either probable cause or an "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the vehicle or its occupants were subject to seizure for violation of the law. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663; State v. Coleman, 791 S.W.2d 504,
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