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State v. Clark12/6/1967
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The following day the defendant was questioned by another officer, and after being advised of his rights, and without being coerced admitted that he did not know whether he shot his wife or not.
On appeal the defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to grant his requested Instruction No. 8. The defendant argues that his requested instruction more fully explains the exception to the general rule that intoxication is not a defense to a crime. However, the trial court not only gave an instruction phrased in language from A.R.S. § 13-132, but also added explanations to the words of the statute. A.R.S. § 13-132 explains the general rule that voluntary intoxication is never a defense to a crime, but it also states that the jury may take into consideration the defendant's intoxication in determining whether he was capable of forming the necessary intent, or purpose, proof of which may be required as an element of a particular offense. The additional informative phrases given by the trial court in its instruction is the language used by our court in State v. Hudson, 85 Ariz. 77, 331 P.2d 1092 (1958), and correctly instructs the jury that voluntary intoxication is to be considered in determining the presence or absence of malice aforethought, which distinguishes murder from manslaughter. See also, State v. Saunders, 102 Ariz. 565, 435 P.2d 39 (decided November 29, 1967).
Since the court's instruction adequately informed the jury as to the legal effect of intoxication, it properly refused an instruction which covered the same subject matter. State v. Sorrell, 95 Ariz. 220, 388 P.2d 429 (1964).
Next we turn our attention to the defendant's statement that the bloodstains on his shirt were caused by his wife crying on his shoulder after she had her teeth pulled, and his subsequent inconsistent remark that his wife had been dead for a long time.
Defendant contends that the failure of Officer Stephens to advise him that what he said could be used against him in court rendered the statements elicited involuntary. However, since the trial of this case began on March 31, 1966, the requirements of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966),
are not controlling. The Supreme Court of the United States in Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), held that the Miranda decision only applied to those persons whose trials began as of June 13, 1966. Although Miranda requires that the police advise a person in custody, and in certain other instances, that what he says can be used against him in court, nevertheless, such advice was not required prior to that decision. State v. Preis, 89 Ariz. 336, 362 P.2d 660 (1961); Wagner v. State, 43 Ariz. 560, 33 P.2d 602 (1934). Indeed, as late as 1964 this court reaffirmed its prior holdings when in State v. McGilbry, 96 Ariz. 84, 88, 392 P.2d 297, 299, we said:
"* * * it is the better and safer course to advise the defendant that what he says could be used against him at the trial * * * but it is not necessary to render either a confession or admission admissible."
Finally, defendant contends that because he was intoxicated at the time he made the exculpatory statements that those statements are involuntary, and therefore inadmissible.
The general rule with respect to confe
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