 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Clark12/6/1967
ssions made by a person under the influence of intoxicants can be summarized as follows: proof that the accused was intoxicated at the time he confessed his guilt will not, without more, prevent the admissibility of his confession. See e. g., Commonwealth v. Chapman, 345 Mass. 251, 186 N.E.2d 818 (1962); People v. Dorman, 28 Cal.2d 846, 172 P.2d 686 (1946); 69 A.L.R.2d 361. However, if it is shown that the accused was intoxicated to such extent that he was unable to understand the meaning of his statements, then the confession is inadmissible. Roper v. People, 116 Colo. 493, 179 P.2d 232 (1947).
In the case before us the defendant did not make a confession, but rather exculpatory statements. Nevertheless, the same rules apply. Although the evidence clearly shows that defendant was intoxicated at the time he made these statements, the record indicates that he still had sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was saying.
Certainly, any man who can manufacture the excuse that bloodstains on his shirt came from his wife's mouth after having her teeth pulled has the control over his mental faculties to understand what he is saying. Moreover, the fact that defendant asked Bennett to help him get out of town clearly shows that he had the mental awareness to attempt to escape the consequences of his act. Of course, the jury may consider intoxication in determining whether the statements are true or false. As the New York Court of Appeals stated in People v. McQueen, 18 N.Y.2d 337, 274 N.Y.S.2d 886, 221 N.E.2d 550 (1966),
"* * * the jury might apply the ancient maxim in vino veritas. The fact that had been drinking bore upon the truth or falsity of statements but was not, in itself, evidence that they were involuntary."
274 N.Y.S.2d at 892, 221 N.E.2d at 554. (Emphasis in original.)
In any event, when Officer Stephens asked the defendant where the bloodstains came from there was not the slightest suspicion that a murder had been committed. No investigation had as yet begun to focus on a particular suspect, for the police had no idea that a murder had been perpetrated. Furthermore, Officer Stephens advised the defendant that he could call an attorney or his wife. His language was in the form of advice, not a question. More important, as soon as the police realized that something was peculiar they immediately refrained from asking any further questions. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), was designed to prevent the police from deriving any benefit from the use of overbearing tactics. In this case, however, the police were careful not to question the accused once they realized he might be involved
in something far more serious than a drunken driving charge.
No error appearing from the record the judgment is affirmed.
|