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STATE v. WARNER12/26/1967
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The fact that the defendant was under arrest by a Fairfield officer who had a responsibility for safeguarding the
Point No. 8. "The court erred in denying defendant-appellant's motion for a mistrial and renewed motion therefor on the ground that the State informed the jury that defendant-appellant had been arrested for a crime for which he had not been convicted."
The defendant refers here to knowledge which the jury may have received that Officer Nelson had arrested the defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor after having come upon him in the driveway in Fairfield. An examination of the record discloses that the reference to the
The justice refused to strike this testimony and, later, to order a mistrial. We see no way in which defendant was prejudiced. The jury knew of defendant's condition as to the use of intoxicating liquor when he stopped in Fairfield and while they had not been told that Officer Nelson had arrested defendant in Fairfield for operating while under the influence, there appears to be no reason why they should not have been told this. Evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is not inadmissible in his current trial when such evidence is an element of the offense with which he is charged or when such evidence itself proves the commission of the offense charged. Bunten v. Davis, 82 N.H. 304, 133 A. 16, 45 A.L.R. 1409 (1926); People v. Thaw, 219 N.Y. 39, 113 N.E. 556, 3 A.L.R. 1537 (1916); Anno. 170 A.L.R. 306.
We find no abuse of the justice's discretion.
Point No. 10. "The court erred in admitting into evidence alleged admissions and confessions in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and to the Maine Constitution."
There has been no requirement in this State, either by statute or by judicial decision, that the accused must receive a warning that his admission may be used against him or that he be informed he may remain silent and consult with counsel. Our court has many times held that the test to be applied to the admission of testimony covering alleged confessions or admissions is the determination of whether it was or was not given voluntarily. State v. Grover, 96 Me. 363, 52 A. 757 (1902); State v. Priest, 117 Me. 223, 103 A. 359 (1918); State v. Merrow, 161 Me. 111, 208 A.2d 659 (1965).
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) made the federal standard for admissibility of confessions controlling in State criminal prosecutions.
These events and the trial of this case took place before the rule of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) was established. The only specific requirements as to warnings and explanations as to silence and counsel prerequisite to the admission of defendant's statements were those established by the United States Supreme Court soon after Malloy in its decision in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). The court there added further qualifications on the voluntary-involuntary test — those of the right of the accused to the assistance of counsel and of warning of right to remain silent under certain circumstances.
Escobedo is regarded as a landmark case establishing the right of a person suspected of crime to have the benefit of counsel's advice and protection before interrogation by law enforcement officers.
The standards set for compliance by law enforcement officers by Escobedo
The justice heard the testimony of the defendant on the motion before he made his f
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