STATE v. WARNER
12/26/1967
* * * shall be a plain, concise and
definite written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense charged. * * *"
While this Rule "is designed to simplify criminal pleading", Section 7.3 Maine
"When the statute both creates and defines an offense not known
to the common law, the * * * indictment must, of course, follow
the statute * * *." Section 21, Directions and Forms for
Criminal Procedure, Whitehouse and Hill; State v. Munsey,
114 Me. 408, 410, 96 A. 729 (1916); Smith, Petitioner v. State of
Maine, 145 Me. 313, 318, 75 A.2d 538 (1950).
Careful criminal pleading would result in the use of a precise allegation of this element of the alleged crime such as the words "and thereby caused the death of Richard Roe within one year" as is suggested in M.R.Crim.P. Form 5, language expressly declared to be sufficient by Rule 58.
It is the right of the defendant, as guaranteed by the Constitution of Maine, Art. 1, Sec. 6, "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation." We have defined the standard of sufficiency of explanation in this manner:
"The test to be applied is whether a respondent of reasonable
and normal intelligence, would, by the language of the
indictment, be adequately informed of the crime charged and the
nature thereof in order to be able to defend and, if convicted,
make use of the conviction as a basis of a plea of former
jeopardy, should the occasion arise." State v. Charette,
159 Me. 124, 127, 188 A.2d 898, 900 (1963).
Applying the standard to this case, would the defendant here be adequately informed that the State was charging that his operation of his vehicle with reckless disregard for the safety of others not only caused the death of Emma Charity but also that her death occurred within one year? As to this latter element of the crime, the indictment, after alleging that the defendant struck the victim with his automobile on January 1, 1966, adds only "as a result of which accident caused the death of the said Emma Charity." The date of Emma Charity's death is not alleged nor is it specifically alleged that her death occurred within one year of January 1, 1966. However, the indictment was returned on February 2, 1966, and bears that date and its language unmistakably informs the defendant that the state charges that on February 2, 1966, Emma Charity was dead, and that she died at some time between the time of the accident and the time of the returning of the indictment, which is obviously less than one year.
This language is an inartistic equivalent of the words "and that her death resulted within one year."
The question had been presented to courts of several other jurisdictions which have held that when an indictment alleges an act which caused death and is returned within the period limited by the statute, it necessarily follows that death occurred within the period, and it adequately informs a defendant as to this essential element of the crime.
"But, in any event, the phraseology criticised is not material,
for the information informs the accused that the mortal wounds
from which Lottie Brace died were inflicted on the 5th day of
November, 1902, and the information is dated on the 8th day of
November, 1902, three days after. So that it must necessarily
follow that the death occurred within three days from the
infliction of the wounds. The information, in all respects,
seems to be sufficient to sustain the judgment." State v.
Champoux, 33 Wn. 339, 74 P. 557, 559 (1903).
"In the instant case it appears from the record that the
indictment was returned within a year and a
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