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STATE v. WARNER12/26/1967
t use the term "proximate cause", he scrupulously defined the State's burden of proof as to causation correctly and in words which have long been considered an acceptable definition of proximate cause. Hatch v. Globe Laundry Co., 132 Me. 379, 171 A. 387 (1934); Thompson v. Frankus, 151 Me. 54, 59, 115 A.2d 718 (1955).
Requested Instruction No. 11, C. 3:
"If you find that he (Melvin Warner) was intoxicated at the
time of these alleged statements, you must find them
involuntary and you must not consider them at all against Mr.
Warner. If you find that at the time of the alleged statements
Mr. Warner was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, you
also must disregard them and not at all consider them against
him."
The court correctly refused this request. The preliminary determination of an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel and to silence which the Escobedo rule, then controlling, required the court to make necessarily included a consideration of the defendant's condition as to the effects of alcohol. When the court submitted the question of the admissions to the jury it became that body's duty to determine whether the alleged admissions were made, whether they were made voluntarily and the weight to be given them.
The great majority of the jurisdictions which have considered this issue have held that proof that the accused was intoxicated at the time he made the admission will not, without more, bar the reception of the admission into evidence. But if it is shown that the accused was intoxicated to the degree of mania, or of being unable to understand the meaning of his statement, then the statement is inadmissible. The effect of alcohol upon the accused goes to the weight and credibility to be accorded the admission by the jury. People v. MacCagnan, 129 Cal.App.2d 100, 276 P.2d 679 (1954); Commonwealth v. Howe, 75 Mass. 110 (1857); Roper v. People, 116 Colo. 493, 179 P.2d 232 (1947); Eiffe v. State, 226 Ind. 57, 77 N.E.2d 750 (1948); State v. Thresher (Mo.) 350 S.W.2d 1 (1961); State v. Smith (Mo.) 342 S.W.2d 940, 941 (1961); Lindsey v. State, 66 Fla. 341, 63 So. 832, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 1077 (1914); Bell v. United States, 60 App.D.C. 76, 47 F.2d 438, 74 A.L.R. 1098 (1931) 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence Sec. 577; 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 828; Anno. 69 A.L.R.2d 358, 362.
The majority rule appears to us to be in accord with our own standards of voluntariness of admissions.
Point No. 7. "The court erred in denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence and the fruits thereof suffered by an unconstitutional and illegal search and seizure and in admitting such evidence and fruits into evidence at the trial."
The evidence complained of under this Point may be divided into two groups, (1) evidence as to dents, markings and foreign substances gained by the state by examination of the car in the dooryard in Fairfield, and (2) evidence gained from examination of the car at Arbo's garage in Waterville.
The defendant now contends the observation of the defendant's car in the driveway by these two officers was an unconstitutional search and seizure. The acts of the officers in examining the outside of the defendant's car in the Fairfield driveway were unobjectionable and violated
"To observe that which is open to view is not generally
considered a `search'." Miller v. United States, 356 F.2d 63,
68 (5th Cir. 1966). See also People v. Davis, 188 Cal.App.2d 718,
10 Cal.Rptr. 610 (1961); United States v. McDaniel,
154 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.C.C. 1957), aff'd, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 144,
255 F.2d 896, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 853, 79 S.Ct. 82, 3 L.Ed.2d
87; Ellison v. United Stat
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