Tarver v. City Commission of Bremerton12/14/1967
with injurious results" as to come within the scope of those cases permitting license revocation on the ground of bad moral character alone.
In support of his final argument, petitioner relies upon State ex rel. Makris v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 296, 302, 193 P. 845, 12 A.L.R. 1428 (1920), in which we held that
n ordinance which authorizes the issuing or withholding of a license to engage in a lawful business, that is, a business which within itself is ordinarily perfectly lawful, and committing to any officer or set of officers the power to decide according to their own notions in each particular case, the question of the propriety of issuing or withholding a license therefor, and thus deciding who may and who may not engage in such business, is authorizing the exercise of arbitrary power in violation of the guaranty of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States . . . . (Italics ours.)
The business activity involved in Makris, supra, was the selling of candy and soft drinks. The ordinance there in question empowered the commissioner of public safety to revoke the license involved "'for disorderly or immoral conduct . . . whenever the preservation of public morality, health, peace or good order shall in his judgment render such revocation necessary.'" (p. 298)
[1, 2] The wisdom and propriety of a municipal ordinance establishing certain standards, regulations or controls for a particular business or occupation is not a question for this court to decide; rather, the scope of our review is limited to determining whether the ordinance is within the scope of municipal power and whether the ordinance and the actions taken pursuant thereto are arbitrary, capricious or unlawful. A review of the prior cases decided by this court indicates that the scope of the state's power to regulate or control the business or occupational activities of its citizens depends in which of the following three general categories the activities involved may be classified: (1) ordinary vocations pursued on private property by private means; (2) social or economic evils, such as gambling or liquor traffic, together with such useful occupations as may, under certain circumstances, become public or private nuisances, because offensive or dangerous to safety, health, etc.; or (3) claims of a private right in, or the extraordinary use of, public property such as streets or parks. State ex rel. Schafer v. Spokane, 109 Wash. 360, 186 P. 864 (1920).
The business activity involved in Makris, supra, was clearly within the first category mentioned above, with respect to which we said, quoting Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781 (1915):
"The right of a citizen to pursue any of the ordinary vocations, on his own property and with his own means, can neither be denied nor unduly abridged by the legislature, for the preservation of such right is the principal purpose of the constitution itself. In such cases, the limit of legislative power is regulation, and that power must be cautiously and sparingly exercised . . . ." State ex rel. Schafer v. Spokane, 109 Wash. 360, 362, 186 P. 864 (1920).
See also, Seattle v. Gibson, 96 Wash. 425, 165 P. 109 (1917) (regulation of drug store); and Vincent v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 475, 197 P. 618 (1921) (regulation of ferris wheel). Petitioner's reliance on Makris, supra, is inappropriate because that holding was expressly limited to activities within the first category above and has no applic
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Washington DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|