 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Tarver v. City Commission of Bremerton12/14/1967
R>
right of a citizen, a common right, a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual and extraordinary. As to the former, the extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but, as to the latter, its power is broader; the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature. This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the authorities."
See also, Baxter-Wyckoff Co. v. Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 555, 408 P.2d 1012 (1965); Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 P. 516 (1917).
Thus, regardless of whether taxicab driving is viewed as an extraordinary use of public property for private gain or as an occupation potentially deleterious to the public, the city of Bremerton, in controlling the operation of taxicabs on its streets, clearly had the power to require all taxicab drivers to be of good moral character. Even though the city may establish standards for the licensing of taxicab drivers or for the revoking of such licenses, petitioner would urge this court to require a degree of definiteness and precision in the establishment of such standards which is simply not possible or practicable in view of the nature of the occupation to be controlled. As the Supreme Court stated in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 553, 61 L. Ed. 480, 37 Sup. Ct. 217 (1916):
t is certainly apparent that if the conditions are within the power of the State to impose, they can only be ascertained by an executive officer. Reputation and character are quite tangible attributes, but there can be no legislative definition of them that can automatically attach to or identify individuals possessing them, and necessarily the aid of some executive agency must be invoked.
Hall, supra, involved a state "Blue Sky" law which, among other things, empowered the commissioner to revoke the license or refuse to renew it upon ascertaining that the licensee "is of bad business repute."
Petitioner argues that, in reality, no standard is established to guide the city in determining whether to revoke a license because (1) the ordinance does not define
precisely what violations are sufficient to classify a person as being no longer morally responsible; and (2) the ordinance does not specifically require that the violations either have occurred while operating a taxicab or relate in any way to the driving of a taxicab. He cites as an example of the possible arbitrary and capricious application of the standards contained in the ordinance the revocation of a license merely because the licensee had violated a zoning ordinance. But we recently held in Seattle v. Long, 61 Wash. 2d 737, 740, 380 P.2d 472 (1963), that
A person may not urge the invalidity of an ordinance unless he is harmfully affected by the particular feature of the ordinance alleged to be an invalid exercise of the police power. A litigant who challenges the validity of an ordinance must claim infringement of an interest peculiar and personal to himself, as distinguished from a cause of dissatisfaction with the general framework of the ordinance. State v. Lundquist, 60 Wash. 2d 397, 401, 374 P.2d 246 (1962) and cases cited.
The revocation of a taxicab license merely because the licensee had violated some zoning ordinance might well be arbitrary and capricious and therefore unlawful on the grounds that the violation lacked any reasonable relationship to the licensed occupation. This, however,
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Washington DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|