 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Johnson v. Gray11/20/2003
There is a general requirement that objections must be raised at the trial level. In re S.A.M. 826 So.2d 1266, 1277 (Miss. 2002); In re V.R. , 725 So.2d 241, 245 (Miss.1998). See Riley v. Doerner , 677 So.2d at 743 n.3; Smith v. State , 572 So.2d 847, 848 (Miss. 1990); Burney v. State , 515 So.2d 1154, 1156-57 (Miss. 1987). This Court has stated that " f no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived." Dorrough v. Wilkes, 817 So.2d 567, 577 (Miss. 2002) (quoting Walker v. State , 671 So.2d 581, 597 (Miss. 1995); Hill v. State , 432 So.2d 427, 439 (Miss. 1983)). Julie claims that the chancellor's failure to recuse himself is a matter of plain error and therefore the issue should not be barred. If the fundamental right of a party has been violated, then an appellate court will address plain error issues on appeal. Pub. Employees' Retir. Sys. v. Dishmon , 797 So. 2d 888, 897 (Miss. 2001). This is not the case here. The chancellor has already put a lot of time into this case. He had already presided over a majority of the hearing, including the temporary motion for modification.
. Julie argues inefficient counsel as the reason an objection was not made to the chancellor's failure to recuse himself. The standard is "that of reasonably effective assistance." Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Julie's counsel did nothing that a reasonable counselor would not have done. Her counsel worked with what little medical testimony she could find, which was only one of Julie's counselors. Also, counsel's failure to object is just further proof that the chancellor was giving advice, not prejudging the case. Julie did not have ineffective assistance; and therefore, no manifest injustice occurred by counsel's failure to ask the chancellor to recuse himself.
B. Chancellor Adversely Prejudging the Case
. Julie asserts that the chancellor interjected himself in the case and thereby showed his prejudice against Julie before he heard her side. This point is without merit. Here the chancellor was the trier of fact and law. There was no jury to prejudice. Once again, his comments regarding what he expected in the way of testimony were merely suggestions on how Julie should proceed. The case was not adversely prejudged; and therefore, no manifest error occurred.
CONCLUSION
. The chancellor did not err in modifying the child custody of Hailey. There was sufficient evidence to show Julie lacked the ability to care for a child. There was sufficient evidence to show that a material change had occurred, that the change was detrimental, and that modification was in the best interest of the child. Therefore, the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed.
. AFFIRMED.
SMITH, P.J., WALLER, COBB, EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR.
PITTMAN, C.J., AND CARLSON, J., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Mississippi DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|