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Stenglein v. Nelson10/24/2003
. Mark S. Stenglein ("Stenglein") appeals the December 9, 2002 judgment entry of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas granting Donna L. Nelson's ("Nelson") motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the trial court in this matter.
. On July 24, 1999, Stenglein was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by Nelson's failure to stop at a stop sign. During the period from July 24, 1999 to July 24, 2001, Nelson was absent from Ohio on two separate occasions: (1) Nelson traveled to Maryland, leaving in the evening of April 4, 2001, and returning at approximately 10:45 p.m. on April 6, 2001, and (2) Nelson traveled to West Virginia, leaving in the morning of April 30, 2001, and returning in the evening of May 1, 2001. Also, Nelson attended a 72 hour drivers' intervention program as a result of a DUI conviction, entering the program in the evening of March 9, 2000, and being released in the afternoon of March 12, 2000.
. Stenglein filed a complaint for personal injuries on July 31, 2001, two years and seven days from the date of the accident. Nelson filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Stenglein failed to file his claim within the relevant statute of limitations. Stenglein filed a brief in opposition to Nelson's motion for summary judgment arguing that the statute of limitations tolled during Nelson's two out-of-state trips, as well as during her attendance at the drivers' intervention program. The trial court found that Nelson's attendance at the drivers' intervention program did not qualify as imprisonment and, therefore, the statute of limitations did not toll for the 72 hours she attended the program. The trial court further found that Nelson's out-of-state absences totaled, at most, four days. Thus, the trial court granted Nelson's motion for summary judgment on December 9, 2002.
. Stenglein timely commenced this appeal and asserts the following assignment of error:
. "The trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment on grounds that R.C. § 2305.15(B) did not operate to toll the running of the statute of limitations for three days."
. Nelson asserted the following cross-assignment of error in her brief:
. "The trial court should have granted summary judgment to Appellee under Ohio Rev. C. § 2305.15(A) for the additional, independent reason that Appellants failed to prove that Appellee's isolated and separate partial-day absences from the State of Ohio during the limitations period added up to sufficient time to toll the statute of limitations for the necessary seven days, and because Appellants also failed to prove that any absence by Appellee from the State of Ohio in any way hampered or impeded Appellants' ability to investigate, prepare, file, or serve their Complaint."
. Stenglein argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because Nelson was confined at the drivers' intervention program. Thus, Stenglein claims the 72 hour drivers' intervention program should be classified as "imprisonment," thereby, entitling Stenglein to toll the statute of limitations for the period in which Nelson was attending said program.
. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact * reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion," which is adverse to the nonmoving party. Civ. R. 56(C). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Moreover, an appellate court conducts a de novo review of the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment. Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 2000-Ohio-186.
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