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State v. Elliott1/22/2003
Officer Ty Brazier testified that he stopped the Defendant after seeing the Defendant's automobile run a stop sign on the night of December 26,1999. The Defendant was eventually placed under arrest for DUI; additional charges, including the one which resulted in the instant conviction, were subsequently brought. In support of its case against the Defendant for violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders ("MVHO") Act, the State introduced a redacted copy of a certified copy of a court order from the Criminal Court of Tennessee, 30th Judicial District, declaring that on January 5, 1995, the Defendant "be, and hereby is declared a Habitual Offender in accordance with the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act and is barred from operating a motor vehicle in the State of Tennessee." The copy of the order was redacted so as to remove reference to the convictions upon which the order was based. This proof, along with proof that the Defendant was indeed driving, was all of the evidence submitted by the State in support of the charge that the Defendant had violated the MVHO Act. However, earlier in the Defendant's trial, which was trifurcated, the State introduced a document titled "Department of Safety Certification as to Status of Operator's License." This document provided that the Defendant's status of driving privileges on December 26, 1999, was "revoked."
The Defendant now contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues that the State had to prove that the court's order declaring him to be an habitual offender remained in effect on the night he was stopped. Our Criminal Code provides that " t is unlawful for any person to operate any motor vehicle in this state while the judgment or order of the court prohibiting the operation remains in effect." Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-616(a). Orders declaring persons to be habitual offenders are inviolate for a period of three years. See id. § 55-10-615(a). Following the expiration of three years after an order declaring a person to be an habitual offender has been entered, however, the person may petition for the restoration of his or her driving privileges. See id. § 55-10-615(b). The instant order was entered more than three years prior to the Defendant's December 1999 arrest. The Defendant thus argues that the State had to prove that his driving privileges had not been restored as of December 26, 1999, in order to satisfy the statutory requirement that he was driving while the MVHO order "remain in effect."
While we admire the Defendant's creative approach to overturning his conviction, we must disagree with his premise. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e) prescribes that " indings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Evidence is sufficient if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tenn. 2000). In addition, because conviction by a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption of guilt, a convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient. See McBee v. State, 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963); see also State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105-06 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).
In its review of the evidence, an appellate court must afford the State "t
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