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Kentucky Bar Association v. Dunn12/19/2002
after the order was entered. Thus, this assertion has no merit.
Respondent also attempts to distinguish "conduct" from "conviction," and argues that he is being unduly punished for his conviction. We disagree. The present matter was not brought against Respondent solely because he was in a DUI accident. Here we consider his conviction for the crime of second-degree assault against an innocent victim. While Respondent's second DUI conviction and the assault conviction may have arisen from the same incident, the two offenses are distinct. Thus, the assault committed by Respondent against the other driver, which we now consider, constitutes an instance of misconduct that is separate from the DUI offense.
SCR 3.130-8.3(b) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to " ommit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." While Respondent's conviction for second degree assault may not adversely reflect on his honesty or trustworthiness, it certainly falls within his "fitness as a lawyer in other respects."
Respondent's actions caused an innocent motorist to suffer numerous severe physical injuries. The Victim Impact Statement from the second-degree assault case reveals that the other driver's injuries included crushed vertebrae, facial lacerations requiring plastic surgery , a shoulder injury requiring surgery, a neck injury, and a loss of peripheral vision. This was indeed an egregious act of misconduct on Respondent's part, to which he has admitted.
Respondent also directs this Court to Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Jones, Ky., 759 S.W.2d 61 (1988), where the intoxicated respondent attorney's behavior caused the deaths of two individuals in a motor vehicle collision. The respondent was convicted by a jury on two counts of reckless homicide and was sentenced to two years on each count, which were ordered to run concurrently. Id. at 62. We then suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years. Id. at 64. Since the respondent attorney in Jones, supra, who was responsible for two deaths, was only suspended for a period of two years, Respondent asserts that it would be "grossly unfair" to suspend him until 2005. We disagree.
In Jones, supra, the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for a period of time that equaled his prison term. Even though Respondent is not currently incarcerated, he remains on probation until February of 2005. If Respondent violates the terms of his probation, then he could be returned to prison. We do not think continuing Respondent's suspension until his probation has ended is unduly harsh, much less grossly unfair. Further, we consider each case on its own merits. We believe the discipline the Board seeks to impose is appropriate given the circumstances of this matter. Accordingly, this Court hereby adopts the Board's recommendation.
Upon the foregoing facts and charges, it is ORDERED that:
1. Respondent, Stephen Ray Dunn, of Providence, Kentucky, is hereby suspended from the practice of law until his criminal probation, for his felony conviction of second-degree assault, is completed.
2. Respondent shall pay costs of this action totaling $275.40.
Lambert, C.J.; Cooper, Johnstone, Keller, Stumbo and Wintersheimer, JJ., concur. Graves, J., dissents because he would first refer this matter to the Character and Fitness Committee for a report before rendering a decision.
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