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State v. Payne11/20/2002
almost every day, and that he would get so upset that he would "blank out." When he came to, he could not always remember what he had done while he was "blanked out."
On cross-examination, the defendant denied having had two guns when he went to Hughlett's house, or having been with Brown at the Aubra Street location. He admitted that he had accepted a ride from Brown after the shooting, but said that he had not known anything about Brown's robbery of Rogers at the time. He testified that he had been around the corner using a pay phone when Brown pulled up and offered him the ride. He said that he had "snapped" when the victim pulled the gun on him, but acknowledged that he did not say anything in his statement to the police, when they located him several months later, about the victim's having pulled a gun. He explained this omission by testifying that he had told the police only what he "felt that they needed to know," that he had killed the victim but had not robbed him. He admitted that his memory of the events surrounding the shooting was not perfect, and that some of what he remembered might have occurred in his dreams. On redirect, he testified that he had told the same story he was telling in court to his defense counsel and their investigators " any, many times."
After deliberating, the jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. Finding several enhancement factors applicable, and no strong factors in mitigation, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the maximum terms of twelve years as a Range I, standard offender for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction, and twenty-five years as a violent offender for the second degree murder conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years.
ANALYSIS
I. Admissibility of Evidence of Brown's Robbery of Rogers
As his first issue, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing Eric Rogers to testify that he was being robbed by Keith Brown just prior to the shooting of the victim.
The admission of evidence generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. See State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 270 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 743 (Tenn. 1998). As our supreme court has explained:
Because the term "discretion" essentially "denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule," we will reverse a decision to admit evidence "only when the `court applied an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining.'" Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d at 270 (quoting State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999)).
We review this issue, therefore, under an abuse of discretion standard.
The defendant contends that evidence that Brown was robbing Rogers should have been excluded either under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 401 on the basis that it was irrelevant to any issue at trial, or under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) on the basis that its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. With respect to the latter, he argues that the jury could have inferred from the testimony that he and Brown were partners in crime, and thus attributed Brown's actions to him. The State responds that the trial court properly found the evidence to be relevant in order to establish the contextual framework for Rogers's testimony, and that Rule 404(b) is inapplicable because the challenged "ot
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