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Healthcare Centers of Texas12/12/2002
anguish, her daughter, son, grandson, and caretakers testified Mrs. Underwood's demeanor was dramatically changed after the assault. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the damages award as remitted, we overrule Healthcare's fourth issue.
Remittitur
Mrs. Rigby attempts to file a cross-point alleging the remittitur was improper. She contends the amount awarded in the original judgment prior to the remittitur should stand. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 46.2 allows the remitting party to contend that all or part of the remittitur should not have been required, but the remitting party must perfect an appeal to raise that point. Tex. R. App. P. 46.2. Rule 26.1(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that if any party files a notice of appeal, another party may file a notice of appeal within the appealable period stated in Rule 26.1(a) or fourteen days after the first filed notice of appeal, whichever is later. Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a), (d). Judgment was signed in the trial court on January 31, 2000. LaPorte filed its notice of appeal on June 30, 2000. Therefore, Mrs. Rigby's notice of appeal was due July 14, 2000. Mrs. Rigby filed a motion to extend time to file notice of appeal on August 31, 2000, which this court denied. Because we do not have a timely perfected appeal from Mrs. Rigby, we cannot consider her cross-point challenging the remittitur. Prior to submission of this appeal, Healthcare filed a motion to strike Mrs. Rigby's cross-point. That motion is granted.
Proximate Cause
In its fifth issue, Healthcare claims the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding of proximate cause. In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence in the prevailing party's favor. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence both supporting and contrary to the jury's finding. Plas-Tex., Inc. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989).
Proximate cause consists of both cause in fact and foreseeability. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992). Cause in fact means that the defendant's act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, which would not otherwise have occurred. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995). At some point in the causal chain, the defendant's conduct may be too remotely connected with the plaintiff's injury to constitute legal causation. Springall v. Fredericksburg Hosp. & Clinic, 225 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1949, no writ).
The law does not hold one legally responsible for the remote results of his wrongful acts and therefore a line must be drawn between immediate and remote causes. The doctrine of proximate cause is employed to determine and fix this line and is the result of an effort by the courts to avoid, as far as possible the metaphysical and philosophical niceties in the age-old discussion of causation, and to lay down a rule of general application which will, as nearly as may be done by a general rule, apply a practical test, the test of common experience, to human conduct when determining legal rights and legal liability.
Id.
To be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent, the negligence must also be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995). The wor
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