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Healthcare Centers of Texas12/12/2002
inst anyone solely because of the criminal act of another. Thus, they want us to conclude that if the corporation was partly responsible (and committed a criminal act) and the third party was partly responsible, a plaintiff could obtain punitive damages. However, paragraph (a) does not contain this limitation. A look at the four situations contained in paragraph (b)—for which a plaintiff can obtain punitive damages against a corporation—helps clarify the issue.
Paragraph (b) provides that in the following situations, a defendant will be liable for exemplary damages in spite of paragraph (a)'s broad proscription against exemplary damages: (1) when an employee of the corporation commits the act; (2) when the corporation itself is criminally responsible as a party to the act; (3) when the criminal act occurs at a place qualifying as a common nuisance (a place people habitually go for prostitution, gambling, to shoot firearms, to engage in organized crime, or to sell, possess, manufacture or use controlled substances); and (4) when a landlord intentionally or knowingly fails to comply with the Property Code's requirements to provide certain security devices for tenants.
For two reasons, I believe this subsection answers Rigby's claim. First, in reading the whole section, we are to assume that the legislature did not commit a vain act—that it listed these situations in paragraph (b) because it thought they were covered by paragraph (a)'s language, and it wanted a plaintiff to be able to obtain punitive damages in these situations. See Meritor Auto., Inc. v. Ruan Leasing Co., 44 S.W.3d 86, 90 (Tex. 2001) (holding a court should examine the entire statute to determine its meaning); Cayan v. Cayan, 38 S.W.3d 161, 165–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (stating that the court does not "lightly presume that the Legislation did a useless act"). We can reasonably assume, then, the legislature listed in paragraph (b) every situation for which it thought a plaintiff should be able—at least potentially—to obtain punitive damages. Second, a common theme—similar to this case—exists in three of these situations: they each involve a criminal act by a third party in conjunction with a grossly negligent or intentional act by a corporation, so that the criminal act likely would not have occurred without the simultaneous "bad" act of the corporation. For example, if the corporate employer had not hired the employee , the rape would not have occurred; if the corporate landlord had put latches on the windows of its apartments, the assault would not have occurred; if the corporation had not operated an illegal gambling operation, the murder would not have occurred. In these situations—like here—the acts are so intertwined, it is impossible to consider one without the other and one could not have occurred without the other.
If the situations enumerated in paragraph (b) would otherwise fall within paragraph (a), so would this one; if the legislature believed—as it apparently did—that these situations were covered by paragraph (a)'s bar on exemplary damages, so is this one.
In short, in spite of the horrid events of this case, we cannot ignore the plain language of the statute. That language states that a corporation is not liable for exemplary damages because of the criminal act of another. Here, LaPorte was subjected to exemplary damages in part, if not primarily, because of the criminal act of another. For that reason, the damages are barred.
Wanda McKee Fowler Justice
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