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Healthcare Centers of Texas12/12/2002
believe Jones was a safety risk when he entered LaPorte, nor was the assault on Mrs. Underwood foreseeable.
In its defense, LaPorte presented the deposition testimony of Virginia Rigby. Mrs. Rigby testified that prior to her death, Mrs. Underwood was blind for six months and had been deaf for two years. Mrs. Rigby testified that she did not seek a mental health professional after her mother's death. The assault on her mother caused Mrs. Rigby shock, but did not cause her any physical pain. Mrs. Rigby testified she suffered no disruption in her daily routine. On the day of the assault, she did not know if her mother understood what was happening. Mrs. Rigby further testified that, prior to the assault, her mother could communicate, either by squeezing her hand, or by speaking. After the assault, Mrs. Underwood did not communicate in any manner. Mrs. Rigby testified that she relived the assault in her mind "about a million times." She stated her mother changed for the worse and "just felt like everything was over."
The jury found LaPorte and Dr. Rapp were negligent and their negligence proximately caused harm to Mrs. Underwood and Mrs. Rigby. It further found that the harm sustained by Mrs. Underwood and Mrs. Rigby resulted from malice attributable to LaPorte and Dr. Rapp. The jury awarded Mrs. Rigby and Mrs. Underwood $2.5 million each in actual damages and assessed $50 million punitive damages against LaPorte. The trial court remitted actual damages to $500,000 each and punitive damages to $10 million.
Punitive Damages
In its first issue, Healthcare claims section 41.005 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code bars an award of exemplary damages because Mrs. Rigby's and Mrs. Underwood's damages were caused by the criminal act of a third party, Jones. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.005 (Vernon 1997). Section 41.005, entitled "Harm Resulting from Criminal Act," provides:
(a) In an action arising from harm resulting from an assault, theft, or other criminal act, a court may not award exemplary damages against a defendant because of the criminal act of another.
(b) The exemption provided by Subsection (a) does not apply if:
(1) the criminal act was committed by an employee of the defendant;
(2) the defendant is criminally responsible as a party to the criminal act under the provisions of Chapter 7, Penal Code;
(3) the criminal act occurred at a location where, at the time of the criminal act, the defendant was maintaining a common nuisance under the provisions of Chapter 125, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and had not made reasonable attempts to abate the nuisance; or
(4) the criminal act resulted from the defendant's intentional or knowing violation of a statutory duty under Subchapter D, Chapter 92, Property Code, and the criminal act occurred after the statutory deadline for compliance with that duty.
(c) In an action arising out of a criminal act committed by an employee , the employer may be liable for punitive damages but only if:
(1) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act;
(2) the agent was unfit and the principal acted with malice in employing or retaining him;
(3) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment; or
(4) the employer or a manager of the employer ratified or approved the act.
Section 41.005(a) bans punitive damages for the criminal conduct of another. It is undisputed that the direct cause of Mrs. Underwood's harm was the criminal conduct of another. Rigby argues that the court's charge allow
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