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Gilley v. Blackstock12/12/2002
nt evidence to the district court of notice of intent to revoke "'render the administrative revocation of appellant's license and the derivative district court review void and the revocation a legal nullity.'" Id. at (citation omitted) (alteration in original). However, timeliness of the district court appeal was not at issue in Mabus.
The relevant statutes and Mabus's holding support the district court's conclusion that Gilley did not timely file her appeal. Section 41-6-44.10 provides, " ny person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under this section may seek judicial review," and " udicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2)(j)(i)-(ii). In reviewing agency adjudicative proceedings, the district court must comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b of the UAPA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(7) (1996). Under the UAPA, " he district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15(1)(a) (1997). The UAPA also requires the challenging party to file its appeal to the district court within thirty days of issuance of the final agency action. Id. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1997). Finally, at the trial de novo, the district court "shall determine all questions of fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings." Id. § 63-46b-15(3)(a) (emphasis added).
Here, the Division revoked Gilley's driver license in an order dated February 25, 2001, yet Gilley filed her appeal to the district court on May 21, 2001, well beyond the UAPA's thirty-day deadline. After the final revocation order issued, Gilley could have timely appealed to the district court for review. At the trial de novo, the Division would have had to produce "'competent evidence that the revocation proceeding was initiated by' service of immediate notice and basic information." Mabus, 1999 UT App 389 at (citation omitted). Failure to provide proper notice would have made the Division's revocation of Gilley's license "'invalid'" and a "'legal nullity.'" Id. (citation omitted). However, because Gilley exceeded the UAPA's thirty day time limit, the district court correctly dismissed Gilley's appeal.
Our holding does not foreclose the pursuit of an extraordinary writ under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available" and an "administrative agency . . . has exceeded its jurisdiction," an aggrieved party may petition the district court for an extraordinary writ. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (a), (d)(2). In Mabus, 1999 UT App 389 at , this court left open the question of whether the immediate notice and basic information requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2)(b) are "jurisdictional." Any "jurisdictional" challenge in district court beyond the UAPA's thirty-day time limit would have to be made as an extraordinary writ. Here, Gilley's district court challenge to the Division's jurisdiction and request for reinstatement of Gilley's driver licence was clearly brought in the form of an appeal. We have closely reviewed the record below and there is no indication that Gilley pursued an extraordinary writ under rule 65B.
CONCLUSION
Gilley's appeal to the district court requesting reinstatement of her driver licence exceeded the UAPA's thirty-day time limit. Therefore, we affirm the district court's dismissal of her appeal.
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge
I CONCUR:
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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