 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Isaak v. Sprynczynatyk4/16/2002
renewal of license and at other suitable times.
Thus, the director has a statutory obligation to regularly keep driving records. Accordingly, Isaak's driving record is a regularly kept record, and establishes prima facie its contents.
[ ] We review an administrative suspension of a driver's license under N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, the Administrative Agencies Practice Act. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. v. DuPaul, 487 N.W.2d 593, 595 (N.D. 1992). We affirm the Department's decision unless we conclude:
1) the decision is not in accordance with the law; 2) the decision violates the constitutional rights of the appellant; 3) provisions of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act were not complied with in the proceedings before the agency; 4) the agency's rules or procedures have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing; 5) the agency's findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence; or 6) the conclusions of law and the agency's decision are not supported by its findings of fact. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. v. DuPaul, 487 N.W.2d 593, 595(citation omitted); see also Houn v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 2000 ND 131, 5, 613 N.W.2d 29.
[ ] A certified copy of Isaak's driving record was admitted into evidence before the administrative hearing officer. Isaak's driving record showed a prior DUI violation for an offense committed in 1998. Isaak's driving record further showed a notice of an opportunity for hearing was issued for the 1998 DUI violation and that, as a result of this first DUI, Isaak's North Dakota driver's license was suspended for 91 days.
[ ] The DUI Isaak was most recently arrested for was, according to the record, his second DUI violation. As a result, the Department was obligated to suspend Isaak's license for 365 days instead of 91 days under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-04.1(1)(providing different penalties for a single offense and for second offense within five years). If Isaak wished to escape this result he should have challenged the 1998 DUI violation and resulting suspension. By arguing the 1998 DUI violation should not now cause a penalty enhancement, Isaak is mounting a collateral challenge to the 1998 conviction. This he cannot do. State v. Larson, 419 N.W.2d 897, 898 (N.D. 1988)(explaining "the proper time to challenge the validity of a driver's license suspension is at a hearing on the suspension").
III.
[ ] The judgment is reversed.
[ ] Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.
Carol Ronning Kapsner
Mary Muehlen Maring
William A. Neumann
Sandstrom, Justice, concurring specially.
[ ] Because part I of the majority opinion is dispositive of the appeal, and because-as the majority holds in part I-the issue in part II was not properly raised on appeal, I would not reach the issue in part II. See N.D.C.C. § 28-32-42(4); Johnson v. Johnson, 2001 ND 109, 13, 627 N.W.2d 779 (we need not answer questions that are not necessary to the determination of an appeal); Vernon v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 1999 ND 153, 27, 598 N.W.2d 139 (we decline to address issues not preserved for our review).
[ ] Dale V. Sandstrom
|