 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Batts2/28/2002
n the ignition and the lights were on but the engine was not running. The truck was parked on the side of a public street.
In State v. Johnny Wade Meeks, No. 03C01-9811-CR-00411 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 3, 1999), a panel of this court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for driving under the influence . Meeks, while intoxicated, was slumped over the steering wheel of his vehicle while it was parked in a restaurant parking lot. The engine was running and the lights were turned on. While the defendant accurately submits that the evidence of Meeks' physical control was more substantial than in the case at issue, that does not mean that the evidence here is insufficient. Each of the officers testified that the defendant, while he was in possession of the car keys and after the police had arrived, attempted to re-enter his car after expressing an intent to drive away. Sergeant Crocker testified that the defendant "stated that he was cold, we [weren't] doing anything and he was leaving." There was testimony that he tried to start the car. From these circumstances, the jury could have inferred that the defendant was in physical control of the vehicle and, absent the officers' intervention, would have driven away.
While this court in Meeks described the facts of that case as testing "the boundaries of the driving under the influence statute" on the issue of physical control, that does not mean, in our view, that its facts constitute the minimum standard of sufficiency. By use of the Lawrence test, it is our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient. Here, the defendant was in the driver's seat of a car parked in a commercial parking lot. The car was operable. He had the keys in his hand, was alone in the vehicle, and was fully capable, except for his intoxication, of driving the car. Most importantly, after he was removed from the vehicle, he complained about the weather and the officers' inaction, stated his intention to leave, and attempted to re-enter the vehicle and start the engine.
Finally, although not raised by the parties, we observe that the judgment of conviction for the defendant's violation of the implied consent law specifies that the one-year license revocation is to run consecutively to the three-year license revocation for DUI. The transcript, however, indicates that the trial court ordered the revocations to run concurrently. In the event of such a discrepancy, the transcript will control. See, e.g., State v. Zyla, 628 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). We therefore modify the judgment to reflect concurrent revocation.
Accordingly, the judgment for violation of the implied consent law is modified to establish that the one-year license revocation period is to run concurrently with the three-year revocation for the defendant's DUI conviction. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.
|