State v. Baker3/8/2002
etion, impose consecutive sentences. Moreover, if the trial court determines that consecutive sentencing is appropriate because the appellant is a dangerous offender, the court must also find that the sentence reasonably relates to the severity of the appellant's offenses and that confinement is necessary to protect society from further criminal conduct by the appellant. See State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 460-61 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995).
In the present case, the trial court imposed consecutive sentencing because the appellant "is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2). Specifically, the trial court stated to the appellant:
It makes me uneasy to think that you would get out any earlier than I could absolutely order you to serve with this record, which indicates a lot of criminal conduct involving drinking and driving and hurting people, vehicular assault, reckless endangerment, multiple DUIs. I don't think I could live with myself if you got out one day early and hurt somebody else or killed somebody because you're drinking and driving.
A review of the appellant's presentence report clearly reveals that the appellant has, in addition to the seven prior felony offenses used to establish his career offender status, numerous convictions for DUI and driving on a revoked license. See State v. Palmer, 10 S.W.3d 638, 649 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Robbie R. Bailey, No. E2001-00210-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 918, at *26 (Knoxville, November 29, 2001). Additionally, the presentence report notes that " he [appellant] has additional driving offense convictions that are not listed above (he was convicted of DUI 8th offense in 1997)." See State v. James Clifford Wright, No. 01C01-9811-CC-00476, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1121, at -8 (Nashville, October 29, 1999); State v. Fred Edmond Dean, No. 03C01-9508-CC-00251, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 10, at -36 (Knoxville, January 10, 1997). We conclude that this history is sufficiently extensive to warrant the imposition of consecutive sentencing.
Moreover, we note that the trial court also had authority to sentence the appellant to consecutive sentences under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-609(f) (1997), which statute provides that " ny sentence received for [failure to appear] may be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence received for the offense for which the defendant failed to appear." See State v. Scotty Ray Haynes, No. 01C01-9706-CC-00227, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 385, at *12 (Nashville, March 27, 1998). "Thus, upon a conviction for failure to appear, it is left to the discretion of the trial court whether to impose a consecutive sentence or a concurrent sentence." State v. John David Rankin, Jr., No. 03C01-9511-CC-00369, 1996 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 510, at *17 (Knoxville, August 19, 1996). Accordingly, the trial court could have, in its discretion, also properly ordered consecutive sentencing based upon this statute.
III. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Page 1 2 Tennessee DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|