Interim Personnel of Central Virginia3/1/2002
ise of reasonable care.
Nevertheless, we hold that the plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to establish that, because of the circumstances of the employment, it should have been foreseeable that East posed a threat of injury to others.
Generally, in order to warrant a finding that negligence is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligent or wrongful act, and that the injury should have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances. Scott v. Simms, 188 Va. 808, 817, 51 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1949).
Negligence carries with it liability for consequences that, in view of the circumstances, could reasonably have been anticipated by a prudent person, but not for casualties which, though possible, were wholly improbable. A party is not charged with foreseeing that which could not be expected to happen. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Scovel, 240 Va. 472, 475, 397 S.E.2d 884, 885 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 948 (1991). However, the precise injury need not be foreseen by a defendant. It is sufficient that an ordinary, prudent person ought, under the circumstances, to have foreseen that an injury might probably (not possibly) result from the negligent act. Blondel v. Hays, 241 Va. 467, 475, 403 S.E.2d 340, 345 (1991).
In the present case, the mere fact that East had been convicted twice of DUI, had failed to pay fines or attend counseling, and had been declared an habitual offender, would not place a reasonable employer on notice or make it foreseeable that East would steal a truck, operate the stolen vehicle during non-business hours for his own frolic, and cause an accident on the open highway distant from the environs of his job.
According to the uncontradicted evidence, East's employment history showed he had been a model employee , never had consumed alcohol at work or reported for work intoxicated, never had been in any motor vehicle accidents, never had taken any item from any employer without permission, and had no record of theft. In sum, it was not Interim's placement of East, or his subsequent acceptance for work at the Association, which was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that foreseeability was a jury issue, and in refusing to sustain Interim's and the Association's respective motions to set the verdict aside. Thus, that portion of the January 16, 2001 order entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff against Interim and the Association will be vacated, and final judgment will be entered here in favor of those defendants.
Reversed and final judgment.
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