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Sweet v. Roy4/26/2002
e to serve the master; and (d) in a case in which the force is intentionally used by the servant against another, it is not unexpectable by the master. See id. § 228(1). Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time and space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. See id. § 228(2).
Defendants argue that at least as to two of the elements - whether the conduct of Leon Roy was "the kind" he was employed to perform, and whether the conduct was "unexpectable" by the master - were disputed.
The court granted judgment to plaintiff as a matter of law on the issue of the trust's vicarious responsibility for the acts of Leon Roy. In reaching this conclusion, it was required to find that "there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue." V.R.C.P. 50(a)(1). The court relied upon the undisputed evidence of Leon Roy's authority and past conduct. According to his testimony, Leon Roy was the manager of the park responsible for all phases of its policy and management. He made all decisions about how the park ran. He was responsible for all decisions on applications to rent a lot in the park. The only other employee was his wife, Paula Roy, who did the bookkeeping and office work. Marcien Roy was retired but did "a little work around the park for Leon."
The court found that there was no evidence that Leon Roy's actions were motivated by personal animus to plaintiff and concluded:
Here, the only reasonable inference from the evidence admitted and the jury's special findings is that Leon Roy's actions were related solely to his position as a mobile home park manager and the employee /beneficiary of the Trust. His self-help eviction efforts directed at plaintiff could only have been motivated by the overall financial goals of the family and the family trust.
We agree with the superior court's analysis.
While there are some factual disputes in this case, there are none bearing on the scope of Leon Roy's authority. In general, we follow the modern view, "that is, the inquiry turns not on whether the act done was authorized or was in violation of the employer's position, but rather whether the acts can properly be seen as intending to advance the employer's interests." McHugh v. Univ. of Vt., 758 F. Supp. 945, 951 (D. Vt.), aff'd, 966 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1991). Thus, there is no requirement that the master specifically authorize the precise action the servant took. See Pelletier v. Bilbiles, 227 A.2d 251, 253 (Conn. 1967) (responsibility of store employee to ensure customers did not misbehave in the store made store owner vicariously liable when employee beat a customer to stop him from misbehaving; "fact that the specific method a servant employs to accomplish his master's orders is not authorized does not relieve the master from liability"). Such a requirement would mean that there could rarely be vicarious liability for intentional torts because the master would not specifically authorize the commission of an intentional tort. The law is to the contrary. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 230, 231 (1958); see also Tarman v. Southard, 205 F.2d 705, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (jury could find taxicab company vicariously liable where taxi driver drove his cab over plaintiff's leg as a result of a dispute over the fare); Sayers v. Boyles, 190 So. 2d 707, 709 (Ala. 1966) (landlord could be found responsible for action of rent-collection agent who assaulted tenant when he did not pay on time); Hechinger Co. v. Johnson, 761 A.2d 15, 25 (D.C. 2000) (where supervisory staff person of store assaulted pl
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