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Ragsdale v. State6/1/2001
No. 1746
Bobby R. Ragsdale was convicted of second-degree sexual assault under AS 11.41.420(a)(3) for engaging in sexual penetration with a woman who was so intoxicated that she was either incapacitated or unaware of the sexual penetration.
On appeal, Ragsdale argues that the current definition of second-degree sexual assault was enacted in violation of the Alaska Constitution's "single subject" clause (Article II, Section 13). Ragsdale also contends that the definition of second-degree sexual assault is unconstitutionally vague.
In addition, Ragsdale contends that the trial judge committed two errors that require reversal of his conviction. Ragsdale was indicted for second-degree sexual assault under alternative theories: that his victim was either "incapacitated" (paragraph (3)(B) of the statute) or "unaware that a sexual act being committed" (paragraph (3)(C) of the statute). Ragsdale argues that the jury should have been instructed that they could not convict him unless they unanimously agreed on one (or both) of these theories. Finally, Ragsdale contends that the trial judge committed error when the judge ruled that a proposed expert witness offered by the defense did not have sufficient expertise to testify.
For the reasons explained here, we reject each of these contentions and we affirm Ragsdale's conviction.
The legislature did not violate the "single subject" clause of the Alaska Constitution when they amended the definition of second-degree sexual assault in 1997
As explained above, Ragsdale was charged with second-degree sexual assault under AS 11.41.420(a)(3), which forbids sexual penetration with a person who the defendant knows is either "incapacitated" or "unaware that a sexual act is being committed". The definition of "incapacitated" is codified in AS 11.41.470(2). Prior to 1997, "incapacitated" was defined to mean:
temporarily incapable of appraising the nature of one's own conduct and physically unable to express unwillingness to act[.] But in 1997, in section 7 of chapter 63 of the session laws, the legislature amended this definition by changing the word "and" to "or". The definition now reads:
temporarily incapable of appraising the nature of one's own conduct or physically unable to express unwillingness to act[.]
Ragsdale asserts that this amended definition of "incapacitated" and, indeed, all other provisions of SLA 1997, chapter 63 were enacted illegally. Ragsdale's argument rests on the "single subject" provision of the Alaska Constitution.
Under Article II, Section 13 of our state constitution, " very bill shall be confined to one subject". Ragsdale points out that SLA 1997, chapter 63 was entitled:
An act relating to the rights of crime victims and victims of juvenile offenses; relating to the collection by victims of restitution from prisoners; relating to the definition of "incapacitated" for sexual offenses; creating the crime of interfering with a report of a crime involving domestic violence; relating to the safety of victims, other persons, and the community in setting bail or conditions of release; relating to access to certain records of the Violent Crimes Compensation Board; amending Rules 6 and 43(d), Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 404 and 615, Alaska Rules of Evidence, and Rule 3, Alaska Delinquency Rules; and providing for an effective date.
Ragsdale argues that a bill affecting so many provisions of law necessarily violates the "single subject" clause. But prior Alaska cases on this issue do not support Ragsdale's position.
The "single subject" rule was intended to prohib
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