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People v. Medina6/25/2001
rvening time between the defendant's first interview and his later confession, the defendant was not in custody and was allowed to return home. There, he had the opportunity to discuss his situation with family members and friends, or to contact an attorney. In fact, the trial court found that during the intervening time frame, the defendant's father had tried to persuade the defendant not to confess. Moreover, the record indicates no continued threats by the police between the November 26 interview and the defendant's November 29 confession.
Furthermore, the conditions present during the defendant's November 29 confession indicate no coercion. First, according to the trial court, the location of the interview was changed from the interview room used on November 26 to an open cafeteria at the defendant's request. Finally, in contrast to the trial court's findings that the defendant was depressed, tired, and had cried during the November 26 interview, the trial court made no findings as to any deterioration of the defendant's mental state immediately prior to or during his November 29 interview. Nor, as the majority acknowledges, does a review of the audiotape recording of the short November 29 interview indicate any police coercion or involuntariness on the part of the defendant. Maj. Op. at 21 ("Were the record restricted to the November 26 videotape and the November 29 audiotape, we might have concluded that both interviews were voluntary.").
I therefore conclude that neither the trial court's findings, nor a review of the balance of the record demonstrate that the defendant's November 29 statement was made involuntarily. There is no indication in the record that the defendant's will had been overborne prior to making his November 29 statement. See Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211; Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d at 816. Instead, the record clearly demonstrates that the defendant, of his own free will, contacted the detective , prearranged a meeting, chose the meeting place (the open cafeteria), and voluntarily made his confession. I would therefore reverse the trial court's order suppressing the defendant's confession. See Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211 (holding that an ultimate conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent or unsupported by evidentiary findings is subject to correction by a reviewing court); Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844 (same); People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Colo. 1987) (same).
C. Conclusion
In summary, I find that the prosecution met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's November 29 confession was made voluntarily and was therefore a product of his own free will. Thus, I find that the defendant's confession was sufficiently attenuated from any alleged coercive police action to have dissipated any resulting taint. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court's order suppressing the defendant's November 29 confession and therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Mullarkey and Justice Coats join in this dissent.
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