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Karamychev v. Dist. of Columbia5/10/2001
stated that he performed the HGN test "numerous times that whole week." He also estimated that since the training course, he had made two to three arrests per week for drinking and driving.
There is no doubt that the administration of the HGN test and the interpretation of the results are subjects "beyond the ken" of a lay juror, see, e.g., Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195, 200 (D.C. 1991), and expert testimony was therefore required. Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C. 1988). In order to qualify as an expert, a witness "must have sufficient skill, knowledge or experience in [the relevant] field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth." Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977) (citation omitted). Scholarship is not a prerequisite for eligibility to testify as an expert witness; the relevant knowledge may be derived from professional experience, including, in particular, experience as a police officer. See John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 13 at 60 & n.15 (5th ed. 1999); Eason v. United States, 687 A.2d 922, 925-26 (D.C. 1996) (police officer with training in blood spatter analysis properly qualified as an expert). Several courts have held that "testimony by a properly trained police officer with respect to the administration and results of the horizontal gaze nystagmatus evidence is admissible without need for further scientific evidence." State v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154, 158 (Iowa 1990); see also State v. Bresson, 554 N.E.2d 1330, 1334-35 (Ohio 1990).
"The admission or exclusion of expert testimony . . . is committed to the trial court's broad discretion." In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 901 (D.C. 1991) (en banc). The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the qualifications of an expert witness. District of Columbia v. Arnold & Porter, 756 A.2d 427, 434 (D.C. 2000). We have therefore accorded the trial court "wide latitude" in this area, Coates v. United States, 558 A.2d 1148, 1152 (D.C. 1989), and the trial judge's decision "should be sustained unless it is manifestly erroneous." Melton, supra, 597 A.2d at 897; Eason, supra, 687 A.2d at 925. Applying this deferential standard to the record evidence of Williams' qualifications, we discern no manifest error or abuse of discretion on the trial judge's part. On the contrary, the evidence was properly admitted.
IV.
Finally, Karamychev contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was operating the Mitsubishi under the influence of alcohol. This contention is without merit. A person is guilty of DUI if he or she is "to the slightest degree . . . less able, either mentally or physically or both, to exercise the clear judgment and steady hand necessary to handle as powerful and dangerous a mechanism as a modern automobile with safety to himself or the public." Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134, 137 (D.C. 1992) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). "The prosecution need not prove any specific degree of intoxication." Id. at 138. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government, with due regard to the right of the trier of fact to assess credibility and to draw reasonable inferences, and we will reverse a conviction only if the evidence "is insufficient as a matter of law to persuade an impartial trier of fact of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 137 (citations omitted).
In this case, the proof of guilt was overwhelming. Karamychev was apprehended in the middle of the night while driving an automobile, at a substantial rate of speed, in the wro
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