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Dreamland Ballroom and Social Dance Club6/20/2001 City of Clearwater v. Abdullaj, 474 So. 2d 1290, 1291 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (disagreeing with trial court's ruling that actions of city in granting occupational license constituted equitable estoppel). Moreover, the mere issuance of an occupational license designation should not lead to a limitation on the City's duty to enforce laws against prostitution, lewdness, and assignation. See United Sanitation Serv. of Hillsborough, Inc. v. City of Tampa, 302 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (refusing to estop city from enforcing ordinance as inconsistent with previously issued occupational license because licensing body does not have the authority to agree to non- enforcement of valid city ordinance); see also North Am. Co. v. Green, 120 So. 2d 603, 610 (Fla. 1959) ("The instances are rare indeed when the doctrine of equitable estoppel can effectively be applied against state action.").
Claimants also maintain that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it omits a scienter requirement and imposes strict liability on the club's owner. Section 796.07(2)(a) makes it unlawful for any person to "own, maintain, or operate any place, structure, building, or conveyance for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution." There is no explicit requirement that the owner know of or participate in the unlawful activity taking place in the building.
Strict liability statutes are not unconstitutional simply because they impose imprisonment as a punishment. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of a felony murder statute); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 608 (1971) (upholding statute prohibiting possession of unregistered hand grenades as constitutional even though no specific intent or knowledge to prove violation is required); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (upholding conviction for transporting drugs even though statute did not contain explicit scienter requirement). Nor is proof of specific intent always required as a matter of state law. See State v. Hubbard, 750 So. 2d 552, 564-65 (Fla. 1999) (DUI manslaughter statute); Quinn v. State, 751 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that section 943.0435, punishing failure of sex offender to register, is not facially unconstitutional because it lacks mens rea requirement). In fact we have previously held that section 796.07 is not facially unconstitutional simply because it omits a scienter requirement and imposes strict liability on an offender. See, e.g., State v. Conforti, 688 So. 2d 350, 356 (Fla. 4th DCA) (holding that section 796.07(1)(b) is facially constitutional), cert. denied, 697 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1997). We therefore reject claimants' argument of facial unconstitutionality.
AFFIRMED.
GROSS and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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