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Miller v. State6/13/2001
After a bench trial, William Roy Miller was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was a less safe driver. Miller appeals his conviction, arguing that the trial court erroneously admitted his prior per se DUI conviction. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On August 4, 1999, the prosecution filed an accusation charging Miller with driving under the influence to the extent that it was less safe to drive. On January 3, 2000, the prosecution filed its motion and notice of intent to present evidence of a similar transaction against Miller to establish his bent of mind and course of conduct. Attached to the motion were the police reports, sentencing documents, traffic citations, arrest affidavits, and plea proceeding record, all of which arose from an August 22, 1996 per se DUI charge against Miller. At the conclusion of the similar transaction pretrial hearing, the trial court granted the motion.
During Miller's bench trial on November 14, 2000, the state introduced the live testimony of Officer G. B. Jones, who arrested Miller for the 1996 DUI, and the plea proceeding record and sentence sheet from that charge. On appeal, Miller argues that the similar transaction should not have been admitted because it was prejudicial, irrelevant, and was introduced improperly.
1. "A trial court's determination that similar transaction evidence is admissible will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Since the state made the three affirmative showings required by Williams v. State to introduce the similar transaction, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The state must first show that it seeks to introduce the evidence for an appropriate purpose, such as illustrating appellant's identity, intent, course of conduct, and bent of mind. Here, the prosecution stated that by introducing Miller's prior DUI offense, it sought to show his bent of mind and course of conduct, which are appropriate purposes in a DUI case.
Next, the state must affirmatively show that the accused committed the independent act. Miller's argument that Officer Jones did not positively identify him as the perpetrator of the 1996 DUI and that the documentary evidence did not establish his identity is without merit. "Even where the defendant is not identified positively as the perpetrator of the independent crime, circumstantial proof may be used to establish his connection to it." When Officer Jones was asked to identify the person who was driving the car he stopped in 1996, he replied, "It's been so long, I couldn't pick him out. But I believe it's the gentleman in the gray suit." In addition, "during the Williams hearing, [Miller] did not dispute that he was the perpetrator of the [prior] offense." Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to enable the trial judge to conclude that Miller committed the prior act.
The last affirmative showing the state must make is that there is a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense or act and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. In Christian v. State, a prior per se DUI offense was admitted in a DUI less safe case. There, we held that " vidence of a prior DUI offense, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its commission, is logically connected with a pending DUI charge as it is relevant to establish that the perpetrator has the bent of mind to get behind the wheel of a vehicle when it is less safe for him to do so." Therefore, Miller's argument that the similar transaction should not have been admitted because it was irrelevant fails.
2. Miller next contends that his conviction should be
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