State v. Bazemore5/10/2001
SM-009C
The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of the charges against Douglas L. Bazemore after determining that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We affirm.
On August 3, 1998, Doraville police officers arrested Bazemore, charging him via three uniform traffic citations with DUI, driving too fast for conditions, and failure to maintain lane. On August 10, 1998, Bazemore filed a demand for jury trial in the Municipal Court of Doraville, and on September 3, Bazemore's case was transferred to the State Court of DeKalb County. On October 1, 1998, Bazemore filed in the state court a demand for jury trial; he further demanded a trial within the present term or the next term under OCGA § 17-7-170. Although the state court placed Bazemore's case on the jury trial calendar call of November 16, 1998, the case was not called for trial on that date because the State had not yet drawn an accusation. Thereafter, on December 21, 1998, the State did draw an accusation, alleging the three original charges and filing the three uniform traffic citations in state court.
The case was placed on the February 17, 1999, jury calendar, and on February 8, 1999, Bazemore filed a motion for discharge and acquittal under OCGA § 17-7-170, contending that the two-term statutory time limitation had expired. The trial court denied the motion on May 12, 1999, concluding that because Bazemore had filed the demand before the State filed the accusation and the uniform traffic citations, his demand was premature and therefore a nullity. On July 19, 1999, on reconsideration, the trial court again denied Bazemore's motion.
The record indicates that no further action was taken on Bazemore's case for approximately ten months, when the case was placed on the May 23, 2000, trial calendar. On May 23, 2000, Bazemore filed a second motion for discharge and acquittal, this time on constitutional grounds.
The trial court granted that motion.
1. The State contends that the trial court erred by granting Bazemore's motion for discharge and acquittal on constitutional grounds. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (92 SCt 2182, 33 LEd2d 101) (1972), the United States Supreme Court identified four factors for courts to consider in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The factors are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and, (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530. None of these factors alone is necessary or sufficient for a finding of deprivation of the right of speedy trial; rather, courts must engage in a "difficult and sensitive balancing process." Id. at 533. We review the trial court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Yates, 223 Ga. App. 403, 404 (477 SE2d 670) (1996).
(a) Length of delay. Here, the delay between Bazemore's arrest and the call of the case for trial was over 21 months, raising a presumption of prejudice and triggering analysis of the other Barker factors to determine whether Bazemore was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (112 SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992). As the delay approaches one year, it generally is "presumptively prejudicial." Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 732 (1) (a) (438 SE2d 626) (1994).
(b) Reason for delay. Minor delays were caused by Bazemore's demands for a jury trial and his motion for discharge and acquittal on statutory grounds. The record does not, however, completely explain the four-month delay between arrest and the filing of the accusation. Further, the
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