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Hermann v. State5/8/2001
t result in a plea that was involuntarily given. The court fully advised Hermann of his sentence. Because the statutorily mandated fees and the cost of Hermann's probation and drug treatment did not lengthen or alter the pronounced sentence, they merely had a collateral effect. See Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581 (1) (513 SE2d 212) (1999). "Adverse unanticipated collateral consequences are not valid reasons for reversing the trial court's refusal to withdraw a plea." Davis v. State, 151 Ga. App. 736, 736-737 (261 SE2d 468) (1979).
In Sherwood v. State, 188 Ga. App. 295 (1) (372 SE2d 677) (1988), we held that a trial court was not required to inform a defendant of all of the "collateral consequences" of his plea of nolo contendere to several traffic offenses and, therefore, that the court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held in Williams v. Duffy, supra, that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to inform a defendant that no portion of his fifteen-year sentence could be served on parole. In Williams, the Court reasoned that ineligibility for parole had only a collateral effect on the defendant's sentence, because it did not lengthen the sentence itself, and that " here is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of such collateral consequences in order for his guilty plea to be valid." Id. at 581.
Hermann relies on Fox v. State, 272 Ga. 163 (527 SE2d 847) (2000); however, that case is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Fox, the defendant had previously pleaded guilty to a burglary charge. When he was sentenced, the court did not mention a special condition of Fox's probation that he waive his Fourth Amendment rights. Instead, a probation officer informed him of the condition after the sentencing and outside the presence of counsel. During a subsequent search of Fox's residence, police discovered marijuana and a firearm. The trial court denied Fox's motion to suppress the evidence found in his home. Reasoning that Fox was not given the option to consider this particular substantive condition of probation, the Supreme Court reversed and held that "under these circumstances, the waiver of Fox's Fourth Amendment rights was not valid." Id. at 165 (1) (emphasis added).
In the case sub judice, Hermann has not unknowingly waived any of his constitutional rights, nor has he been given a longer sentence than that to which he agreed. Rather, he has been subjected to statutorily mandated fees and has been asked to pay the costs associated with his drug treatment as collateral consequences of his probation. "The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision." Davis, supra at 737, citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (90 SC 1463, 25 LE2d 747) (1970). Accordingly, we find that the court did not err in denying Hermann's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Judgment affirmed.
Blackburn, C. J., and Pope, P. J., concur.
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