 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Erik M.6/19/2001
Grafton
The juvenile, Erik M., appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Fitzgerald, J.) accepting transfer of his case under RSA 169-B:24 by the Franklin District Court (Townley-Tilson, J.). We reverse and remand.
The following facts appear in the record and are not disputed by the parties on appeal. The juvenile was charged with negligent homicide (driving while intoxicated) following a crash in which his friend was killed. See RSA 630:3, II (Supp. 2000). At the time of the crash, the juvenile was nearly seventeen. The State petitioned to certify him as an adult and transfer the case to superior court.
The district court granted the petition, noting that because of the nature of the charge and the juvenile's age, it presumed that the factors listed in RSA 169-B:24, I (Supp. 2000) supported transfer. See RSA 169-B:24, IV (Supp. 2000). The court stated that after reviewing the evidence, it found that the relevant criteria were satisfied.
The State moved the superior court to accept the certification and transfer. Over the juvenile's objection, the court granted the State's motion without a hearing. The superior court noted that the district court's order contained "extremely lean written findings" and "conclusory language" and was "noteworthy for its absence of reasoning." Nonetheless, the superior court ruled that the district court's order "ma a finding that is supported by the evidence." After balancing all of the factors enumerated in RSA 169-B:24, I, and considering the presumption in favor of certifying a juvenile accused of negligent homicide, the court found the district court's decision "fairly supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing at the district court and . . . not erroneous as a matter of law."
On appeal, the juvenile argues that the district court's order did not comply with the statutory mandates governing such orders. The juvenile also argues that the superior court erroneously ruled upon the State's transfer motion without a hearing.
I. Alleged District Court Error
The juvenile asserts that the district court's order was deficient because it did not contain factual findings or establish a nexus between the evidence and the statutory criteria for transfer. See RSA 169-B:24, II (Supp. 2000). We agree.
Our review of the district court's order is limited to "whether the court fairly considered all the applicable factors of RSA 169-B:24 . . . and whether its decision is supported by the evidence and not erroneous as a matter of law." In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 684 (1993) (quotation omitted). The superior court's review of the district court's order is similarly limited in scope. Id. at 683. "We work from the same record as the superior court and, thus, owe no deference to that court's decision on acceptance." Id. at 684.
RSA 169-B:24 governs orders to transfer juvenile delinquency cases to superior court. Under RSA 169-B:24, the district court must consider eight factors when determining whether to transfer a juvenile's case to superior court. See RSA 169-B:24, I. The district court's order to transfer must contain "a written statement of findings and reasons for such transfer." RSA 169-B:24, II. When a juvenile is charged with negligent homicide (driving while intoxicated), there is a presumption that the factors listed in RSA 169-B:24, I, support transfer to superior court. See RSA 169-B:24, IV.
While we have previously approved of district court orders that contained some conclusory language, and factual findings upon most, but not all, of the statutory criteria, see State v. Riccio, 130 N.H. 376, 380-81 (1988), the order at issue was entirely co
Page 1 2 New Hampshire DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|