 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Erik M.6/19/2001
nclusory and contained no factual references whatsoever. As such, it violated RSA 169-B:24, II. The district court's assertion that it considered the evidence and relevant criteria is insufficient absent references to the evidence it considered and application of the criteria to that evidence. See In re Eduardo L., 138 N.H. at 691. We again urge district courts to be "more generous in their written recitation of findings and reasons supporting transfer." Riccio, 130 N.H. at 381.
The State asserts that RSA 169-B:24 was satisfied because the evidence supported transfer and because the superior court was able to review whether transfer was appropriate, despite the district court's summary order. We disagree. In support of its argument, the State relies upon cases involving orders on motions to suppress. These cases are inapposite, however, because orders on motions to suppress are not governed by RSA 169-B:24. Under RSA 169-B:24, the superior court sits as an appellate court, reviewing the district court's order for an abuse of discretion. Although it was possible for the superior court to review the record and apply the statutory criteria in the first instance, this was not its job. Having been confronted with a district court order that did not comply with RSA 169-B:24, the superior court should have remanded to the district court for appropriate findings.
The juvenile also argues that the district court's failure to issue written findings violated his constitutional right to due process. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15. Because we reverse upon statutory grounds, we do not address the juvenile's constitutional challenge. See In re Ethan H., 135 N.H. 681, 688 (1992).
II. Alleged Superior Court Error
We review the superior court's decision about whether to hold a hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Thomas v. Finger, 141 N.H. 134, 137 (1996).
The juvenile argues that oral argument was required in this case because the issues were hotly contested. In support of this argument, he relies upon Supreme Court Rule 18 which, he claims, "recognize the importance of oral argument when there are contested issues of law which cannot be routinely decided." The juvenile's reliance upon Supreme Court Rule 18 is misplaced. This matter is governed by Superior Court Rule 58, which grants the superior court discretion to deny hearings on motions. See Super. Ct. R. 58; see also State v. Roy, 138 N.H. 97, 98 (1993).
The juvenile asserts that Superior Court Rule 58 does not apply to this matter because it is a criminal action. To the contrary, even assuming that transfer to superior court is a criminal matter, Rule 58 applies. See Super. Ct. R. 115; see also State v. Watson, 120 N.H. 950, 952 (1980) (discussing Rule 58 in criminal case context).
We hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by denying the juvenile's request for oral argument. The juvenile did not meet the requirements of Rule 58 because, when he requested a hearing, he did not set forth any reasons why a hearing would assist the trial court. See Provencher v. Buzzell-Plourde Assoc., 142 N.H. 848, 852 (1998).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
BROCK, C.J., and BRODERICK and NADEAU, JJ., concurred.
|