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Hammell v. Warden6/27/2001
Merrimack
Horton, J., retired, specially assigned under RSA 490:3.
The petitioner, Michael Hammell, appeals the denial by the Superior Court (Smukler, J.) of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
The trial court found the following facts, which are not disputed on appeal. The petitioner was arrested on April 27, 1996, and later charged in district court with driving while intoxicated, subsequent offense, see RSA 265:82 (1993 & Supp. 2000), and driving after being certified a habitual offender, see RSA 262:23 (Supp. 2000). The petitioner was bound over to the superior court and indicted on the habitual offender charge. The State entered nolle prossequi on the DWI charge in district court and then filed the same charge by information in the superior court. The petitioner was convicted by jury of both charges, sentenced and incarcerated.
The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the superior court on the grounds, among other things, that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the DWI charge. The court dismissed the petition and the petitioner appeals.
The petitioner argues that under RSA 502-A:12-a (1997), only the district court, as a regional jury trial court, had jurisdiction to hear his DWI case. The petitioner argues that this statute supersedes and modifies the pre-existing jurisdictional scheme governing misdemeanor charges and "establishes exclusive jurisdiction in those regional jury trial courts [designated by the supreme court] to try misdemeanor cases originated there."
"On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole." In re Justin D., 144 N.H. 450, 452 (1999) (quotation omitted). We look first to the "language found in the statute and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to words used." Appeal of Astro Spectacular, 138 N.H. 298, 300 (1994) (quotation and citation omitted). "Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation." Rye Beach Country Club v. Town of Rye, 143 N.H. 122, 125 (1998). Accordingly, we now examine the statutory scheme governing the respective jurisdictions of the superior and district courts over misdemeanor charges.
Under RSA 592-A:1 (1986), " he superior court has jurisdiction of all criminal cases and proceedings; but it may dismiss a prosecution originally begun therein which is within the jurisdiction of a district or municipal court." District courts, in turn, "have original jurisdiction, subject to appeal, of all crimes and offenses committed within the confines of the district in which such court is located which are punishable by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both." RSA 502-A:11 (1997). Accordingly, under the statutory scheme thus far, district courts have original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, and the superior court has "concurrent but discretionary jurisdiction with the district . . . courts over misdemeanors." State v. Blouin, 110 N.H. 202, 203 (1970).
Prior to 1992, the statutory scheme further provided that a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor in district court had the right to bring, see RSA 599:1 (1986) (current version at RSA 599:1 (Supp. 2000)); RSA 502-A:12 (Supp. 1992) (current version at RSA 502-A:12 (1997)), and the superior court had jurisdiction to hear, see RSA 592-A:2 (1986), an appeal of that conviction. We have construed these provisions as affording a defendant appealing a conviction in district court the right to a de novo jury trial in the superior court. See State v. Ring, 106
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