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State v. Santillanes6/29/2001
cide and child abuse prohibit the same conduct, the Court of Appeals disregarded its own double jeopardy analysis. As we explained in Cleve, the starting point in a general/specific statute rule inquiry with respect to two criminal statutes is a comparison of the elements of the crimes under the Blockburger test. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, 26. In its double jeopardy analysis, the Court of Appeals determined under an elements inquiry that "the statutes stand independently of one another, and neither subsumes the other because the charge of child abuse resulting in death requires . . . the death of a child and vehicular homicide requires that the death occur as a result of a defendant driving a vehicle while intoxicated." Santillanes, 2000-NMCA-017, 7. The Court of Appeals recognized that this difference in elements creates a presumption in favor of multiple punishment, id.; it also creates a presumption against application of the general/specific statute rule. Although the presumption in favor of multiple punishment is overcome in this case "by the generally accepted notion that one death should result in only one homicide conviction," id. 8, there is no analogous principle to support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Legislature intended to limit the prosecutor's charging discretion.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that under the Blockburger test the elements of the crimes differ; thus, we apply the factors outlined in Cleve to determine the intent of the Legislature. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, 26. First, for child abuse resulting in death and vehicular homicide, as with the two crimes in Cleve, "the violation of one of these statutes would not commonly result in violation of the other." Id. 31; cf. Guilez, 2000-NMSC-020, 23 (stating that "there are obvious instances in which reckless driving would not be child abuse"). Additionally, as we recognized with respect to reckless driving and child abuse in Guilez, 2000-NMSC-020, 17, the crimes of vehicular homicide and child abuse have different purposes. See generally 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.03, at 202 (6th ed. 2000) ("Characterization of the object or purpose is more important than characterization of subject matter in determining whether different statutes are closely enough related to justify interpreting one in light of the other."). Similar to the prohibition of reckless driving in Section 66-8-113, the crime of vehicular homicide punishes conduct that places the general public at risk of serious harm, the result of which causes another's death. Cf. Guilez, 2000-NMSC-020, 17. By contrast, as we explained in Guilez, Section 30-6-1(C) is "designed to give greater protection to children than adults" because children "are more vulnerable than adults" and "are under the care and responsibility of adults." Guilez, 2000-NMSC-020, 17. "When an adult, without justification, endangers a child's safety, the adult is more culpable than when the safety of another adult is jeopardized." Id. Finally, the history of the child abuse statute "clearly shows the egislature's intent to protect children from abuse" and "compels the conclusion that the egislature has expanded protection for children." Id. 18. From all relevant indicia of legislative intent, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to limit the discretion of the prosecutor in charging an individual who caused the death of a child in a manner that otherwise meets the elements of both crimes with the violation of either Section 30-6-1(C) or Section 66-8-101 when the crime occurred during the operation of a vehicle.
We do not believe that Section 66-8-101.1, proscribing the injury to a pregnant woman by vehicle, supports a contrary l
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