State v. Quesenberry5/24/2001
ntence which the trial court granted on June 30, 1999. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal June 23, 1999.
Appellant's first assignment of error states:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE STATE'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT OFFICER FLANAGAN HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST APPELLANT."
Appellant argues that Officer Flanagan lacked probable cause to arrest him. He alleges that Officer Flanagan's acts of placing handcuffs upon him and placing him handcuffed in the back of the police cruiser turned an investigative stop into an arrest.
This court has previously concluded on numerous occasions that our standard of review with respect to a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Lloyd (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 95, 100; State v. Winand (1996), 116 Ohio App.3d 286, 288, citing Tallmadge v. McCoy (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 604, 608. Such a standard of review is appropriate as, " n a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses." State v. Hopfer (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 521, 548, quoting State v. Venham (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 653. As a reviewing court, this Court must accept the trial court's factual findings and the trial court's assessment of witness credibility. State v. Brown (Sept. 7, 1999), Belmont App. No. 96-BA-22, unreported at 2, citing State v. Anderson (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 688, 691. However, once this Court has accepted those facts as true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the applicable legal standard. State v. Williams (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 41, overruled on other grounds as stated in Village of McComb v. Andrews (Mar. 22, 2000), Hancock App. No. 5-99-41, unreported, 2000 WL 296078.
As recently discussed by this Court in its decision in State v. Whitfield (Nov. 1, 2000), Mahoning App. No. 99-CA-111, unreported, 2000 WL 1670679, a seizure occurs when a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he was not free to go. Id. at *3, citing United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 554. Upon being handcuffed and placed in the back of a police cruiser, a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to go. However, not all seizures constitute arrests. Id. at *3, citing Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 16. A Terry investigative stop is a seizure that does not rise to the level of an arrest. Id. at *3. In determining whether an act amounts to an arrest or an investigative stop this Court noted:
"An arrest, which must be supported by probable cause to be valid, is characterized by four elements: (1) an intent to arrest; (2) under real or pretended authority; (3) accompanied by actual or constructive seizure or detention; (4) which is so understood by the person arrested." Id., citing State v. Barker (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 135, 139.
As in this Court's decision in Whitfield, the missing element in the instant cases is the intent to arrest. As noted in Whitfield:
"Admittedly, under certain circumstances, the act of handcuffing may manifest the officer's intent and cause an investigatory stop to ripen into an arrest. However, this act does not automatically convert a stop into an arrest. In some cases, the act of handcuffing may constitute a reasonable means to detain an individual stopped during an investigatory stop. One must look at the totality of the facts and circumstances in making such a determination." (Emphasis sic; Citations omitted.) Id. at *3.
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