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Jarrett v. Woodward Bros.5/25/2000
d that "the unexcused violation by a tavern keeper of D.C. Code § 25-121 (b) by serving a person already intoxicated or apparently intoxicated, renders the tavern keeper negligent per se, and that where injuries are proximately caused to a member of the public by that violation the tavern keeper may be liable in damages." Id. at 1276.
Rong Yao Zhou considered and resolved two competing legal principles, adopting the view that issues like these are within the realm of the judiciary because they involve the application of traditional principles of common law negligence. 534 A.2d at 1273. The other, articulated by the dissenting opinion in Rong Yao Zhou, is the "premise that this kind of remedy should be left to the political process." Id. at 1278 (Nebeker, J., dissenting). Some jurisdictions - not the District of Columbia - have enacted statutes expressly creating liability in these situations; while other jurisdictions have refused to extend liability without legislative mandate. The Supreme Court of Delaware, considering the same issue before us in a case where the patron was served by the tavern while visibly intoxicated and was later hit by a car, articulated the following principle:
We do not suggest that Dram Shop liability, or a responsibility akin to it, is undesirable public policy or that adoption in Delaware would lend to illogical or unfair results. On the contrary, we think that a law which imposes some such responsibility on a licensee who wilfully or carelessly serves alcohol to an intoxicated patron has much to commend it. But, in our view, the General Assembly is in a far better position than this Court to gather the empirical data and to make the fact finding necessary to determine what the public policy should be as to a Dram Shop law, and the scope of any such law. Wright, supra note 11, 437 A.2d at 556. Rong Yao Zhou clearly rejected that approach. See 534 A.2d at 1273; M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971) (a division of the court cannot overrule a prior decision of the court).
In this jurisdiction, a statute creates civil liability "where a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to protect persons in the plaintiff's position or to prevent the type of accident that occurred, and the plaintiff can establish his relationship to the statute." Ceco Corp. v. Coleman, 441 A.2d 940, 945 (D.C. 1982) (quoting Richardson v. Gregory, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 263, 266, 281 F.2d 626, 629 (1960)). In such a case, "unexplained violation of that [statutory] standard renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Richardson, 108 U.S. App. D.C. at 266, 281 F.2d at 629). Thus, in Rong Yao Zhou we expressly rejected the view that where violation of a statutory safety standard is alleged, only an express or implied statutory cause of action will be recognized, and adopted instead the approach applied by the court in Marusa. See Rong Yao Zhou, 534 A.2d at 1273. In Marusa, the court articulated the guidelines for when a statute creates civil liability:
It is settled law in this court that "violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety" can give rise to a negligence action . . . . Generally, the law or regulation should be one designed to promote safety; the plaintiff must be "a member of the class to be protected" by the statute; and the defendant must be a person upon whom the statute imposes specific duties. 157 U.S. App. D.C. at 353-54, 484 F.2d at 833-34 (citing Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 108 U.S. App. D.C. 385, 389, 282 F.2d 943, 947 (1960)).
We have already determined that § 25-121 (b) is designed to promote safety, and that breach of that statutory standard creates tavern keeper liability to inn
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