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Jarrett v. Woodward Bros.5/25/2000
iting the presence of persons under the age of eighteen on the premises of liquor retailers during school hours, with the intent
to prevent persons of school age from entering liquor stores, in recognition of the seriousness of alcohol abuse among young people and the serious loitering problems that often result. This provision serves to diminish the exposure of young people to the sale of alcohol and provides an additional mechanism to prevent the illegal sale of alcoholic beverages to underage persons. Id. § 12 at 53.
The history of legislative amendments to the ABC Act thus shows the legislature's broadening concern from morality and public order, to safety concerns resulting from drunk driving by those under twenty-one years of age, to the danger to the safety and health of those who consume alcohol, particularly those who abuse it and those who are underage. Although the matter is not free from doubt, we conclude that, in the context of this legislative trend and the statutory language mandating that licensees are not to "permit consumption" by underage and intoxicated persons, Adam Jarrett, who was both an underage patron and, if the testimony of his companions is credited, visibly abusing alcohol at the time, was a member of the class the legislature sought to protect. We apply the basic principle articulated in Ceco Corp. that "where a particular statutory or regulatory standard is enacted to protect persons in the plaintiff's position or to prevent the type of accident that occurred, and the plaintiff can establish his relationship to the statute, unexplained violation of that standard renders the defendant negligent as a matter of law." 441 A.2d at 945 (citing Richardson, 108 U.S. App. D.C. at 266, 281 F.2d at 629). Therefore, Adam Jarrett, or his parents on his behalf, state a cognizable claim that Winston's breached a duty to him if it violated the standard established in D.C. Code § 25-121 (b).
III.
Having determined that D.C. Code § 25-121 (b) provides the basis for civil liability by a tavern owner to an injured underage intoxicated patron, we turn to consider whether, as the trial court determined, the claimant's own unlawful actions constitute contributory negligence or assumption of the risk that, as a matter of law, would bar recovery. We hold that they do not.
The District of Columbia is one of the few jurisdictions in which the claimant's contributory negligence can act as a complete defense to the defendant's liability for negligence. See Felton v. Wagner, 512 A.2d 291, 296 (D.C. 1986). The common law defense of contributory negligence is not available, however, to defeat liability for negligent conduct that contravenes a statutory mandate because " tatutes and regulations should not be overborne by the common law." Martin, 395 A.2d at 68-69. We have determined that the statute at issue here, § 25-121 (b), has as its purpose not only the safety of the general public but also the health and safety of the patrons who frequent bars and restaurants that serve alcohol. Thus, a patron's contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery for negligent violation of the statutory standard.
Nonetheless, we have recognized that in certain circumstances the claimant's assumption of risk could, unlike the defense of contributory negligence, preclude liability even when predicated on violation of a statutory mandate. See Martin, 395 A.2d at 74. In this case, it is argued that, by consuming alcohol to the point of intoxication earlier in the evening and asking for more once he arrived at Winston's, Adam Jarrett assumed the risk of his intoxicated state; in other words, that he acted "with willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for hi
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