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State v. Carter11/25/1997
ng a final decision on the cases by this Court. Additional facts will be provided as necessary to dispose of the issues raised.
DISCUSSION
Issue 1
Did the District Court err in admitting lay witness opinion testimony?
The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Stringer (1995), 271 Mont. 367, 374, 897 P.2d 1063, 1067.
During the trial of No. 95-203, the State asked its eyewitness, Kucera, three questions pertaining to his opinion as to whether Appellant was intoxicated the night of December 29, 1993. In framing the questions, the State used terms like "What was your impression," "What was your concern," and "What was your feeling." Over objection, Kucera answered the questions, stating that based on what he observed, Appellant was intoxicated.
Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting Kucera's answers because the form of the State's direct questions was improper under Rule 602, M.R.Evid. Rule 602, M.R.Evid., provides that "a witness may not testify as to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter." Appellant asserts that Kucera's statements about his "impression," "concern," and "feeling" that Appellant was intoxicated do not meet the required standard of testifying from personal knowledge.
Appellant's argument is without merit. Rule 701, M.R.Evid., provides:
Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
Additionally, in State v. Bradley (1993), 262 Mont. 194, 864 P.2d 787, we held that Rule 701, M.R.Evid., did not preclude a lay witness from testifying to a person's state of intoxication. Bradley, 864 P.2d at 789 (citing Commission Comment, Rule 701, M.R.Evid.; State v. Hardy (1980), 185 Mont. 130, 134, 604 P.2d 792, 795).
It is undisputed that Kucera was a lay witness. An examination of the record makes clear that Kucera's opinions or inferences as to Appellant's intoxication were rationally based on his perception and personal knowledge. During direct-examination of Kucera, the State established that Kucera knew the objective signs of intoxication, that he had much experience being around people who have been in varying states of intoxication, and that he had observed Appellant for quite some time before alerting the police. Because the State complied with the foundational requirements of Rules 602 and 701, M.R.Evid., we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Kucera's lay witness opinion testimony.
Issue 2
Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the charge of resisting arrest on the basis of insufficient evidence?
The standard of review for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Granby (1997), [283 Mont. 193], 939 P.2d 1006, 1009.
In No. 95-203, Appellant was charged with resisting arrest in addition to his DUI charge. Appellant argues that sufficient evidence did not exist to support the charge of resisting arrest. Section 45-7-301(1), MCA, provides the following:
A
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