State v. Stephens12/5/1997
is disproportionate "ultimately rests upon the 'experienced judgments' of the members of this Court." State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 198, 443 S.E.2d 14, 47, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547, 115 S. Ct. 642 (1994).
This case is distinguishable from the cases in which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate and entered a sentence of life imprisonment. First, the defendant was convicted of the murders of three individuals. "We have remarked before, and it bears repeating, that this Court has never found disproportionality in a case in which the defendant was found guilty for the death of more than one victim." State v. Price, 326 N.C. at 96, 388 S.E.2d at 107. Further, the jury convicted the defendant on the theory of malice, premeditation, and deliberation in all of the murders. "The finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-blooded and calculated crime." State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990).
We recognize that juries have imposed sentences of life imprisonment in several cases which have similarities to the present case. However, "the fact that in one or more cases factually similar to the one under review a jury or juries have recommended life imprisonment is not determinative, standing alone, on the issue of whether the death penalty is disproportionate in the case under review." State v. Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 47. Our review of such cases reveals that they are distinguishable and do not render the sentences of death in this case disproportionate. None of those cases involved a defendant who committed a triple murder, with regard to which the jury found the same aggravating circumstance to exist in all three and an additional aggravating circumstance in two of the murders. It suffices here to say that we have examined all of the cases cited by defendant and conclude that each of them is distinguishable from the present case.
Further, this case is similar to cases in which we have found the death penalty proportionate. We have upheld a sentence of death where, as in this case, the jury found the aggravating circumstances involved in the present case. Here, we conclude that the present case is more similar to certain cases in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have found the sentence disproportionate or those in which juries have consistently returned recommendations of life imprisonment. E.g., State v. Ingle, 340 N.C. 108, 455 S.E.2d 664 (1995) (double murder as to which the jury found the aggravating circumstances that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and that the murder was part of a course of conduct involving other violent crimes--death sentence proportionate); State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1, 449 S.E.2d 412 (1994) (double robbery-murder as to which the jury found the aggravating circumstances that the murder was part of a course of conduct including other violent crimes; that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in homicide, rape, robbery, etc.; and that defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony--death sentence proportionate), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1091, 131 L. Ed. 2d 738, 115 S. Ct. 1815 (1995).
Based on the nature of these crimes, and particularly the features noted above, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the sentences of death were disproportionate. We hold that defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free of prejudicial error.
NO ERROR.
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