State v. Stephens12/5/1997
he sentencing phase when the statements are relevant and trustworthy, Barts, 321 N.C. at 180, 362 S.E.2d at 240, this Court has never stated that the rules of evidence should be totally abandoned. We conclude that the proffered testimony of Jordan concerning the pawning of Mrs. Barrow's rings had no relevance to the (f)(4) mitigating circumstance, and this assignment of error is overruled.
In his fifth assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in denying defendant's request to peremptorily instruct the jury that defendant had no significant history of criminal activity. The defendant argues that his misdemeanor offenses and his history of drug abuse do not constitute a significant history of prior criminal activity, and he was, therefore, entitled to a peremptory instruction that he had no significant history of prior criminal activity and that the jury should accord mitigating weight to that circumstance. We do not agree.
A peremptory instruction is appropriate when all evidence goes to support that circumstance. State v. Wooten, 344 N.C. 316, 334, 474 S.E.2d 360, 370 (1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 137 L. Ed. 2d 348 (1997) ; State v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467, 492, 434 S.E.2d 840, 854 (1993). The trial court must give a peremptory instruction on a statutory mitigating circumstance when the evidence is uncontroverted. State v. Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 344, 462 S.E.2d 191, 207 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 134 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1996). The crucial issue for this Court is thus whether the evidence is uncontroverted that defendant had no significant history of criminal activity. Generally, "significant means important or notable." State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 20, 320 S.E.2d 642, 654 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 84 L. Ed. 2d 369, 105 S. Ct. 1232 (1985). Upon review of this evidence, it is apparent that while the evidence relevant to this mitigating circumstance was of such nature that a sentencing jury could reasonably find this circumstance to exist and its submission to the jury was thus proper, there was evidence of prior criminal activity and convictions, and it was thus for the jury to decide whether these constituted a "significant" history. The evidence establishes that defendant was convicted in 1982 of hit-and-run property damage and driving under the influence . In 1983, he was convicted of driving while his license was suspended; in 1986, he was convicted again of driving under the influence. Furthermore, defendant had a long history of purchasing and using illegal drugs. The trial court did not err by refusing a peremptory instruction and by leaving to the jury the determination of the existence of this statutory mitigating circumstance.
In his sixth assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously allowed the State's challenge for cause of two prospective jurors, Lillie Vinson and Thurmon Holder, who indicated that they might have difficulty voting in favor of the death penalty. In addition, defendant complains that he was not given the opportunity to rehabilitate prospective juror Holder. We conclude there was no error in this regard.
This Court has held: "Whether to allow a challenge for cause in jury selection is a decision ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court which will not be reversed on appeal except for abuse of discretion." State v. Locklear, 331 N.C. 239, 247, 415 S.E.2d 726, 731 (1992); accord State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 28, 357 S.E.2d 359, 364 (1987). The standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the prospective juror's views would "'prevent or substantially impair the
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