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State v. Woodruff11/21/1997
arison with other factors courts typically use in sentencing.
{36} Third, we consider the governmental cost of providing additional safeguards. If we were to reject Nichols under a state constitutional analysis, the practical effect would be a requirement of counsel in every DWI case in order to give effect to the Legislature's intent with respect to enhancement. See Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 179. While there is currently a statutory requirement of counsel in all cases in which there is a potential for imprisonment of more than six months, see Section 31-16-3(A), the imposition of a constitutional requirement for all misdemeanor DWI cases would be significantly more burdensome to the state both fiscally and administratively.
{37} On balance, the private liberty interest at stake in the use of one prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for the enhancement of a current DWI conviction is not sufficiently important to outweigh the relatively low risk of error of enhancement based on a mistaken conviction and the significant governmental cost of providing counsel in all misdemeanor DWI cases. See Porter, 671 A.2d at 1285 (Morse, J., Concurring) ("The requirement that counsel be afforded to all indigent DUI defendants in order to effectuate the recidivist statute is simply too big a price to pay for the relatively small marginal gain in 'reliability.'"). We conclude that the use of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor DWI conviction not resulting in a sentence of imprisonment to enhance a subsequent misdemeanor DWI conviction does not violate the New Mexico Constitution.
VII.
{38} For these reasons, we conclude that Woodruff's 1971 DWI conviction was valid under the New Mexico Constitution as well as the United States Constitution. We have said that the Indigent Defense Act and the Public Defender Act "are, in the main, responses to sixth amendment rights to counsel for the actual defense of criminal charges." . We have specifically characterized the rights granted by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States as similar to the rights mentioned in Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution. . We said in Gomez that " state court adopting [the interstitial] approach may diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics." , P19. We conclude that the issue in this case arises out of the due process guarantee of the state constitution. Woodruff has not provided a basis for divergence from federal precedent in the arguments made to this Court, and our own research and analysis has identified none. Under these circumstances, we conclude that at present we have no basis for construing the right to due process guaranteed under the New Mexico Constitution more broadly than that protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment against violation by state action. See Porter, 671 A.2d at 1282; Richert, 548 N.W.2d at 927-28. Therefore, Woodruff's conviction for driving while under the influence as a second offense is affirmed.
{39} IT IS SO ORDERED.
PAMELA B. MINZNER, Justice
WE CONCUR:
GENE E. FRANCHINI, Chief Justice
JOSEPH F. BACA, Justice
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice
DAN A. McKINNON, III, Justice
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