 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
LOYAL AMERICAN LIFE INS. v. MATTIACE5/24/1996
>
I joined him in that view, which the Court has refused to accept.
In Kountz, I suggested that the Legislature might wish to address the public policy concerns shown by the proliferation of cases filed by policyholders who felt that they had been wronged. Although the legislature did not accept my challenge to adopt legislation to allow the recovery of additional damages for claimants forced to go to court to enforce their rights, the legislature did address some of the problems presented by the creation of the tort of bad faith, but this Court has methodically and systematically struck down practically all of that legislation as violating a plaintiff's right to trial by jury, even though the Supreme Court of the United States, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), in a footnote, made a referral to one of those statutes in its discussion of constitutional protection against excessive jury verdicts. Pacific Mutual, 499 U.S. at 20, n. 9, 111 S.Ct. at 1044 n. 9.
I have followed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court relating to the recovery of punitive damages, including the latest decision, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, which involved a punitive damages claim based on an alleged misrepresentation by a manufacturer as to repairs made to an automobile. The cases suggest an increasing concern on the part of that Court about standardless awards of punitive damages — and many of those cases are Alabama cases. Although the Supreme Court, in the BMW case, did not draw a "bright line" distinction between what amount is permissible and what amount would be so greatly disproportionate to the award of compensatory damages as to offend the Constitution, it did set forth several general principles of law, one of which was articulated in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 667-68, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) ("To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort"). It seems to me that the insurer in this case had a legal right to dispute the claim; therefore, to punish the insurer for refusing to pay the claim is a due process violation.
Based on the foregoing, I believe that this Court should grant Loyal American the relief to which it is entitled under the law.
Before concluding this dissent, I write about one other portion of the majority opinion, which addresses Loyal American's argument that § 11 of Alabama's constitution was violated by the judgment in this case because, it argues, the right to trial by jury was "frozen" by the ratification of the 1901 Constitution and the bad faith cause of action was not created until 1981. I agree with the majority's conclusion that § 11 applies to " ommon law causes of action" and that those actions "are those in which legal rights are determined, as opposed to equitable rights." 679 So.2d at 239. That holding is consistent with what I said in my discussion of § 11 in my dissent in Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So.2d 878 (Ala. 1993), but I must respectfully disagree with the majority's statement that in Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 292 So.2d 651 (1974), the Court's statement using the word "frozen" was "dictum." In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 592 So.2d 156, 159 (Ala. 1991), this Court said:
"The right to a jury trial in the courts of this state is guaranteed by Ala. Const. art. I, § 11. Section 11 provides in toto: 'That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.' As we explained in Gilbreath v. Wallace, 292 Ala. 267, 292 So.2d 651 (1974), the 'crucial words' found in that section are ' "shall remain inviolate." ' The clause 'forbi
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Alabama DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|