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LOYAL AMERICAN LIFE INS. v. MATTIACE5/24/1996 otally unrelated cause. So, I think the converse would not be true that you could prove materiality because the death or the damage or the injury was occasioned by the condition which was misrepresented."
As noted above, we will not reverse a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence unless its ruling was an abuse of discretion. Grayson, supra. We conclude that the court did not err in excluding the evidence at issue. It is clear from the record before us that whether Joseph was intoxicated at the time of his death was not relevant to the critical issue of this case — whether it was Loyal American's standard procedure not to issue a life insurance policy at a standard rate where the applicant had had a DUI conviction in the prior year.
IV. Directed Verdict Motion
We must next determine whether the trial court erred in denying Loyal American's motion for a directed verdict on Sue Mattiace's breach of contract and bad faith claims. In Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 863 (Ala. 1988), this Court stated:
"The standard of review applicable to a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is identical to the standard used by the trial court in granting or denying the motions initially. Thus, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on either motion, we determine whether there was sufficient evidence to produce a conflict warranting jury consideration. And, like the trial court, we must view any
evidence most favorably to the non-movant."
(Citations omitted.)
A. Breach of Contract
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Sue Mattiace, the nonmovant as to Loyal American's motions for a directed verdict and a J.N.O.V., we must determine whether Sue Mattiace presented sufficient evidence in support of her breach of contract claim to produce a conflict warranting jury determination. It is uncontested that a contract of life insurance existed between Loyal American and Joseph Mattiace. Sue Mattiace argues that the insurance contract was breached by Loyal American's failure to pay her the policy benefits upon Joseph's death. Loyal American argues that it did not breach the contract, because, it says, it was acting within its legal rights in rescinding the contract and denying her claim for benefits based on Joseph's misrepresentation that he had not had a DUI conviction in the preceding five years.
Loyal American notes that the concept of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract runs to both parties of an insurance contract, both the insurer and the insured. It argues that Joseph acted in bad faith by failing to disclose his DUI conviction when he applied for the insurance.
The legislature has recognized the nature of the relationship between an insurer and an insured by enacting Ala. Code 1975, § 27-14-7. That section states:
"(a) All statements and descriptions in any application for an insurance policy . . . shall be deemed to be representations and not warranties. Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless either:
". . . .
"(2) Material either to the acceptance of the risk or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or
"(3) The insurer in good faith would either not have issued the policy or contract, or would not have issued a policy or contract at the premium rate as applied for. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
Given the effect of § 27-14-7, we must determine whether there was at least a question of fact warranting a jury determination on whether Loyal Am
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